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IS "INTERNAL CONSISTENCY" FOOLISH?: 
REFLECTIONS ON AN EMERGING 
COMMERCE CLAUSE RESTRAINT ON 
STATE TAXATION 
Walter Hellerstein * 
Before 1983, the Supreme Court had never uttered the phrase "in-
ternal consistency" in a state tax opinion. 1 Since 1983, however, the 
Court has invoked the principle of "internal consistency" on four sep-
arate occasions in adjudicating the validity of state taxes under the 
commerce clause.2 Indeed, by 1987, the Court could refer almost cas-
ually to the "internal consistency" criterion as "the test . . . we have 
applied in other contexts."3 The Court's talk of "internal consistency" 
cannot be dismissed as mere rhetoric. Three of the four taxes that 
have been put to the "internal consistency" test have flunked it;4 cases 
approving taxes that, in retrospect, would have failed the test have 
been overruled;5 and the test has cast a constitutional shadow over 
many other taxes. 6 In the eyes of some members of the Court, more-
over, general application of the "internal consistency" doctrine as a 
tool of commerce clause analysis is "an entirely novel enterprise"7 that 
would "revolutionize the law of state taxation."8 
Whatever role "internal consistency" may come to play in the 
Court's commerce clause jurisprudence, it has already emerged as a 
doctrine that warrants our attention. This article traces the develop-
* Professor of Law, University of Georgia; A.B., Harvard, 1967; J.D., University of Chi· 
cago, 1970.-Ed. I am deeply indebted to Donald Regan for his detailed and illuminating cri-
tique of an earlier draft of this article; I am grateful as well to Milner Ball, Andrew Frey, Paul 
Kurtz, James Smith, Michael Wells, and Prentiss Willson, Jr., for their helpful comments. 
1. The assertion is based on a LEXIS search of Supreme Court opinions for the phrase "in-
ternal consistency." 
2. American Trucking Assns. v. Scheiner, 107 S. Ct. 2829, 2840 (1987); Tyler Pipe Indus. v. 
Washington Dept. of Revenue, 107 S. Ct. 2810, 2820 (1987); Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 
638, 644-45 (1984); Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983). 
3. Scheiner, 107 S. Ct. at 2840. 
4. Scheiner, 107 S. Ct. 2829; Tyler-Pipe, 107 S. Ct. 2810; Armco, 467 U.S. 638. 
5. See Scheiner, 107 S. Ct. at 2845-47 (overruling Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 
U.S. 542 (1950); Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of R.R. Commrs., 332 U.S. 495 (1947); 
Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Commn., 295 U.S. 285 (1935)); Tyler Pipe, 
107 S. Ct. at 2820 (overruling General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964)). 
6. See text at notes 86-136 infra. 
7. Scheiner, 107 S. Ct. at 2850 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
8 . . Tyler Pipe, 107 S. Ct. at 2825 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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ment of the doctrine, explores its implications, and considers its defen-
sibility as a limitation on state taxing power .. The article suggests that 
the results the Court reaches under the "internal consistency" doctrine 
could be reached by rigorous application of a more familiar commerce 
clause principle - one to which the Court has been less than faithful. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE "INTERNAL 
CONSISTENCY" DOCTRINE 
A. Container Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax Board 
The Supreme Court first suggested that the principle of "internal 
consistency" constrained state taxing power in Container Corporation 
of America v. Franchise Tax Board. 9 In discussing the constitutional 
limitations on the states' power to tax the income of a multistate busi-
ness, the Court observed that the due process and commerce clauses 
require the states to be "fair"10 in applying apportionment formulas to 
determine how much of the enterprise's income they may tax. The 
Court then declared: "The first, and ... obvious, component of fair-
ness in an apportionment formula is what might be called internal 
consistency - that is, the formula must be such that, if applied by 
every jurisdiction, it would result in no more than all of the unitary 
business' income being taxed."11 
Read in context, the Court's statement was unexceptional. The 
Court has long interpreted the commerce and due process clauses as 
requiring that taxes be fairly apportioned to the taxpayer's activities in 
the taxing state.12 The fair apportionment requirement serves the 
function, among others, of implementing the commerce clause prohi-
bition against multiple taxation of interstate commerce. 13 If a tax is 
9. 463 U.S. 159 (1983). 
10. 463 U.S. at 169. 
11. 463 U.S. at 169. Wholly apart from the question of the intrinsic fairness of an apportion-
ment formula, a formula, though "internally consistent," may be unfair to a particular multistate 
taxpayer because it effectively taxes extraterritorial values. In Container, the Court characterized 
this second aspect of the fairness of an apportionment formula as the requirement of "external 
consistency - the factor or factors used in the apportionment formula must actually reflect a 
reasonable sense of how income is generated." 463 U.S. at 169. 
12. See, e.g., Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18, 26 (1891) (commerce 
clause); Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U.S. 275, 281-83 (1919) (due process clause). 
13. The multiple taxation doctrine forbids the states from imposing taxes that subject inter-
state commerce to a risk of multiple taxation not borne by local commerce. See Western Live 
Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 255-56 (1938); J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, 
STATE AND LoCAL TAXATION 219-21 (5th ed. 1988); text at notes 149-72 infra. As Justice 
Rutledge articulated the doctrine in his concurring opinion in International Harvester Co. v. 
Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 358 (1944): 
fl1he state may not impose certain taxes on interstate commerce, its incidents or instrumen-
talities, which are no more in amount or burden than it places on its local business, not 
because this of itself is discriminatory, cumulative or special or would violate due process, 
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fairly apportioned to a taxpayer's activities in the state, there is no 
risk, at least in principle, that it will violate the multiple taxation doc-
trine by subjecting interstate commerce to a multiple tax burden not 
borne by local commerce. 
Despite this general rule against multiple taxation, the Court has 
been quite tolerant in permitting the states to adopt apportionment 
formulas of their own choosing, even though the adoption of varying 
formulas by different states may in fact subject the interstate business 
to multiple taxation.14 So long as a state's formula is intrinsically fair, 
it is not constitutionally infirm merely because the adoption by a sister 
state of another intrinsically fair formula could create "some over-
lap"15 in taxation. The explanation for this exception to the com-
merce clause prohibition against multiple taxation lies in the Court's 
inability to determine which of the two competing formulas is "at fault 
in a constitutional sense"16 without prescribing uniform rules of ap-
portionment among the states. The Court recognized that "the legis-
lative power granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause of the 
Constitution would amply justify the enactment of legislation requir-
ing all States to adhere to uniform rules for the division of income."17 
But the Court ha8 declined to undertake that task itself because it be-
lieves that it is neither institutionally equipped nor constitutionally au-
thorized to do so. 
The leeway the Court has accorded the states to design their own 
apportionment formulas, however, does not extend to formulas that, if 
adopted generally, will inevitably subject a multistate enterprise to 
multiple taxation. A formula ceases to be intrinsically fair when, if 
applied across all taxing states, it subjects a multistate enterprise to 
taxation of more than 100% of its tax base.18 This is because the doc-
trine of intrinsic fairness requires equity to the taxpayer whose tax 
base happens to be taxable in part by several states rather than in 
but because other states also may have the right constitutionally, apart from the commerce 
clause, to tax the same thing and either the actuality or the risk of their doing so makes the 
total burden cumulative, discriminatory or special. 
14. See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978); Hellerstein, Commerce Clause Re-
straints on State Taxation: Purposeful Economic Protectionism and Beyond, 85 MICH. L. REV. 
758, 763-66 (1987). 
15. Moorman, 437 U.S. at 277. 
16. 437 U.S. at 277. 
17. 437 U.S. at 280. 
18. This assumes, of course, that the intrastate business is subject to a tax on only 100% of 
its tax base. The unfairness of formulas that inevitably tax the interstate business on more than 
100% of its tax base is that they expose the interstate business to greater tax burdens than those 
borne by its intrastate competitor. A tax that subjected every business, interstate and intrastate 
alike, to an exaction on 150 or 200% ofits appropriate tax base would not be intrinsically unfair, 
just somewhat bizarre. 
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whole by a single state. Thus, for taxes to be intrinsically fair, the sum 
of the taxes derived from the parts may not exceed the taxes derived 
from the whole. Adventitious multiple taxation arising from the inter-
action of two inconsistent, but intrinsically fair, apportionment formu-
las may be the price we pay for federalism. Predictable multiple 
taxation arising from the generalized application of a single, intrinsi-
cally unfair, apportionment formula is a price we need not pay. 
The Court's reference to "internal consistency" in Container ap-
peared simply to remind us of this point. In fact, the Court made no 
further reference to the "internal consistency" criterion in its opinion, 
which was largely devoted to its analysis sustaining the application of 
California's widely accepted (and "internally consistent") three-factor 
apportionment formula to the taxpayer's worldwide combined in-
come.19 One would have been prescient indeed to detect the birth of a 
new principle of commerce clause jurisprudence in the Court's brief 
description of an "obvious[ ] component of fairness in an apportion-
ment formula."20 
B. Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty 
Less than a year after Container, the Court attributed broader sig-
nificance to the "internal consistency" doctrine in Armco, Inc. v. Har-
desty. 21 In Armco, the Court considered a claim of state tax 
discrimination under West Virginia's business and occupation (B & 0) 
tax. 22 The B & 0 tax was a broad-based excise upon the privilege of 
engaging in most business activity in the state, including manufactur-
ing and wholesaling. The tax was measured by gross business receipts. 
In general, if a taxpayer engaged in two different business activities, it 
paid a tax upon the privilege of engaging in each activity. A "multiple 
activities" exemption, however, relieved manufacturers subject to the 
manufacturing tax from liability for the wholesaling tax. The manu-
facturing tax was imposed at a higher rate than the wholesaling tax. 
19. The most widely accepted formula for apportioning the income of a multijurisdictional 
business among the states employs three factors: real and tangible personal property, payroll, 
and sales. By averaging the ratios of the taxpayer's property, payroll, and sales within the state 
to its property, payroll, and sales throughout the business, the formula yields a fraction that can 
be applied to the taxpayer's net income to determine the portion taxable by the state. In 
Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983), the Court described the 
three-factor formula as "something of a benchmark against which other apportionment formulas 
are judged." 463 U.S. at 170. See generally Hellerstein, State Income Taxation of Multijurisdic-
tional Corporations: Reflections on Mobil, Exxon, and H.R. 5076, 79 MICH. L. REv. 113 (1980) 
[hereinafter Hellerstein, State Income Taxation]. 
20. Container, 463 U.S. at 169. 
21. 467 U.S. 638 (1984). 
22. 1971 W. Va. Acts 169 (repealed effective July 1, 1987). See Armco, 467 U.S. at 640 n.2. 
142 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:138 
Armco, an Ohio manufacturer engaged in wholesaling in West 
Virginia, charged that the levy discriminated against interstate com-
merce because it taxed out-of-state manufacturers who sold at whole-
sale in the state, while exempting in-state manufacturers who sold at 
wholesale in the state. The Supreme Court agreed that the tax on its 
face discriminated against interstate commerce.23 The existence of a 
higher B & 0 tax on in-state manufacturers did not cure the discrimi-
nation because the manufacturing.tax could not be viewed as substan-
tially equivalent to the wholesaling tax.24 Furthermore, and most 
importantly from the standpoint of the present inquiry, the Court re-
jected the state's contention that Armco had "to prove actual discrimi-
natory impact on it by pointing to a State that imposes a 
manufacturing tax that results in a total burden higher than that im-
posed on Armco's competitors in West Virginia."25 
This is not the test. In Container ... the Court noted that a tax must 
have "what might be called internal consistency - that is the [tax] must 
be such that, if applied by every jurisdiction," there would be no imper-
missible interference with free trade. In that case, the Court was discuss-
ing the requirement that a tax be fairly apportioned to reflect the 
business conducted in the State. A similar rule applies where the allega-
tion is that a tax on its face discriminates against interstate commerce. 
A tax that unfairly apportions income from other States is a form of 
discrimination against interstate commerce .... Any other rule would 
mean that the constitutionality of West Virginia's tax laws would depend 
on the shifting complexities of the tax codes of 49 other States, and that 
the validity of the taxes imposed on each taxpayer would depend on the 
particular other States in which it operated.26 
West Virginia's tax plainly failed the "internal consistency" test. 
If every state imposed a tax like West Virginia's, the enterprise that 
manufactured in one state and wholesaled in another would pay a 
manufacturing tax to the state of manufacture and a wholesaling tax 
to the state of sale. Due to the levy's "multiple activities" exemption, 
however, the wholly intrastate manufacturer/wholesaler would pay a 
tax only on its manufacturing activity. Hence, the scheme would 
place the interstate manufacturer/wholesaler at a competitive disad-
vantage to the intrastate manufacturer/wholesaler by saddling the for-
mer with a multiple tax burden not borne by the latter and would thus 
23. Armco, 467 U.S. at 642. 
24. 467 U.S. at 642-43. See generally Hellerstein, Complementary Taxes as a Defense to Un-
constitutional State Tax Discrimination, 39 TAX LAW. 405 (1986) [hereinafter Hellerstein, Com-
plementary Taxes]. 
25. Armco, 467 U.S. at 644. 
26. 467 U.S. at 644-45 (citation omitted). 
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create an "impermissible interference with free trade."27 
The Court's extension of the "internal consistency" .test to ques-
tions beyond the intrinsic fairness of a state's apportionment formula 
did not escape tP,e attention of Justice Rehnquist. He vigorously ob-
jected to the Court's focus on hypothetical tax burdens borne by the 
interstate business, observing that the Court's prior decisions indicated 
"that when considering whether a tax is discriminatory, 'equality for 
the purposes of competition and the flow of commerce is measured in 
dollars and cents, not legal abstractions.' "28 Armco in fact had paid 
no manufacturing tax to Ohio, so there was no actual discrimination 
in the case. The Court, according to Justice Rehnquist, "sidestepped" 
this fact by 
borrowing a concept employed in our net income tax cases. Under that 
line of cases a state tax must have an internal consistency that takes into 
consideration the impact on interstate commerce if other jurisdictions 
employed the same tax. It is perfectly proper to examine a State's net 
income tax system for hypothetical burdens on interstate commerce. 
Nevertheless, that form of analysis is irrelevant to examining the validity 
of a gross receipts tax system based on manufacturing or wholesale 
transactions. Where a State's taxes are linked exactly to the activities 
taxed, it should be unnecessary to examine a hypothetical taxing scheme 
to see if interstate commerce would be unduly burdened. 29 
Justice Rehnquist would thus have sustained West Virginia's B & 0 
tax, despite its internal inconsistency, because of his view that "inter-
nal consistency" analysis should play no role outside the specific con-
text in which it was first invoked. 
C. Tyler Pipe Industries v. Washington Department of Revenue 
Three years after addressing the challenge to West Virginia's B & 
0 tax in Armco, the Court revisited the "internal consistency" doc-
trine in addressing a similar challenge to Washington's B & 0 tax in 
Tyler Pipe Industries v. Washington Department of Revenue. 30 Like 
West Virginia, Washington_ imposed its B & 0 tax on gross receipts 
from various business activities carried on in the state, including man-
ufacturing and wholesaling. Like West Virginia, Washington had a 
"multiple activities" exemption, which assured that taxpayers engaged 
in both manufacturing and wholesaling in the state would pay tax on 
only one activity. But, instead of exempting local manufacturer/ 
27. 467 U.S. at 644. 
28. 467 U.S. at 647 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. 
v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64, 70 (1963)). 
29. 467 U.S. at 648 (citation omitted). 
30. 107 S. Ct. 2810 (1987). 
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wholesalers from the state's wholesaling tax, as West Virginia had 
done, Washington exempted them from the state's manufacturing tax. 
In so doing, Washington avoided the particular problem of facial dis-
crimination the Court had identified in Armco. Out-of-state manufac-
turers who made wholesale sales in Washington would pay the same 
tax on their wholesaling activities as their Washington-based competi-
tors who manufactured and wholesaled their products in the state.31 
In the Court's view, however, the fact that both out-of-state and 
local manufacturers paid the same wholesaling tax under Washing-
ton's B & 0 tax did not cure the constitutional defect in Washington's 
tax. Judged by the standard of "internal consistency," Washington's 
levy was as constitutionally infirm as West Virginia's. Just as the in-
terstate manufacturer/wholesaler in Armco was put at a competitive 
disadvantage to the intrastate manufacturer/wholesaler on the as-
sumption that every state had adopted West Virginia's taxing scheme, 
so the same disadvantage would exist in Tyler Pipe on the assumption 
that every state had adopted Washington's taxing scheme. In each 
instance, the interstate manufacturer/wholesaler would pay both a 
manufacturing tax to the state of manufacture and a wholesaling tax 
to the state of sale, whereas the intrastate manufacturer/wholesaler 
would pay but one tax-. a manufacturing tax under West Virginia's 
statute or a wholesaling tax under Washington's. In short, the Court's 
conclusion that Washington's taxing scheme was the "practical 
equivalent"32 of West Virginia's, from the standpoint of "internal con-
sistency," was inescapable.33 
31. While avoiding facial discrimination against the out-of-state manufacturer making in· 
state sales, Washington's scheme introduced a different form of facial discrimination against the 
local manufacturer making out-of-state sales. Local manufacturers making out-of-state sales 
paid a manufacturing tax whereas local manufacturers making in-state sales did not. Although 
the discrimination arguably disappeared if one considered that local manufacturers making in-
state sales paid a tax on their in-state sales activity equal to the tax that local manufacturers 
making out-of-state sales paid on their local manufacturing activity, a similar point was made, 
and rejected, in Armco with respect to the manufacturing tax paid by local manufacturer/whole-
salers. See text at note 24 supra; Tyler Pipe, 107 S. Ct. at 2816-19. 
32. 107 S. Ct. at 2817. 
33. Even though it struck down Washington's B & 0 tax as applied to interstate manufac-
turer/wholesalers, the Court in Tyler Pipe did suggest two alternatives for curing the constitu-
tional defects in the statutory scheme by "eliminating exposure to the burden of a multiple tax on 
manufacturing and wholesaling." 107 S. Ct. at 2819. First, the state could provide a credit 
against Washington manufacturing tax liability for wholesale taxes paid by Washington manu-
facturers to any state, 107 S. Ct. at 2819-20, and a credit against Washington wholesale tax 
liability for manufacturing taxes paid by out-of-state manufacturers to other states. 107 S. Ct. at 
2821. The credit would effectively leave the intrastate manufacturer/wholesaler in the same po-
sition it enjoyed under Washington's existing tax: it would receive a credit against its manufac-
turing tax liability for the wholesale taxes it paid, which has the same effect as an exemption from 
manufacturing tax liability because the manufacturing and wholesaling taxes were imposed at the 
same rates. At the same time, the credit would guarantee that the Washington manufacturer 
selling in other states paid only a single tax - a wholesale tax to the state of sale, if the state of 
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The Court's reaffirmance of its commitment to the "internal con-
sistency" principle drew an impassioned dissent - this time from Jus-
tice Scalia, 34 who was not on the Court when Container and Armco 
were decided. Justice Scalia took the Court to task for its application 
of an "internal consistency" principle that was "nowhere to be found 
in the Constitution."35 He chided the Court for overruling "a rather 
lengthy list of prior decisions"36 in applying the "internal consistency" 
test to the case before it. And, while characterizing as "dictum"37 
Armco's extension of the "internal consistency" principle to questions 
other than fair apportionment, Justice Scalia declared that if one nev-
ertheless "insists on viewing it as holding, and thus as conflicting with 
decades of precedents upholding internally inconsistent state taxes ... 
Armco rather than those numerous other precedents ought to be 
overruled. "38 
Justice Scalia's quarrel with the Court over its application of the 
"internal consistency" principle, however, was based more on consid-
erations of constitutional policy than on any abstract commitment to 
stare decisis. Scalia was willing to accept application of the principle 
in the apportionment context where "an inconsistent ... scheme could 
sale imposed such a tax, or a manufacturing tax to Washington if it did not. The credit would 
likewise guarantee that the out-of-state manufacturer selling in Washington would pay only a 
single tax - a manufacturing tax to the state of manufacture, if the state of manufacture imposed 
such a tax, and a wholesale tax to Washington if it did not. The second alternative suggested by 
the Court was simply to repeal the manufacturing tax. 107 S. Ct. at 2821. 
In apparent response to the Court's first suggestion, the Washington legislature enacted legis-
lation providing credits against Washington B & 0 tax liability for gross receipts taxes paid to 
other states. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 82.04.440 (Supp. 1988). Under the legislation, 
Washington manufacturers making out-of-state sales and out-of-state manufacturers maldng 
sales in Washington receive a credit against B & 0 tax liability for gross receipts taxes they pay to 
other states. This so-called "credit fix" was estimated to cost the state $42 million. 1988 Daily 
Tax Report (BNA) No. 24 at H-9 (Feb. 5, 1988). The Washington Supreme Court limited the 
fiscal damage from the Court's opinion by holding that it should only apply prospectively and 
that refunds therefore were not required. National Can Corp. v. Washington Dept. of Revenue, 
199 Wash. 2d 878, 749 P.2d 1286, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2030 (1988). 
It is worth noting that the second alternative suggested by the Court - repealing the manu-
facturing tax - would not protect the interstate business from the very burdens the Court identi-
fied in Tyler Pipe, even though it would solve the "internal consistency" problem. If half the 
states adopted taxes on manufacturing (without taxes on wholesaling) and halfthe states adopted 
taxes on wholesaling (without taxes on manufacturing) the interstate manufact.urer/wholesaler 
would still suffer the competitive disadvantage of paying two taxes while its intrastate counter-
part paid only one. For further discussion of and a suggested solution to this problem, see text 
accompanying notes 216-20 infra. 
34. Justice Scalia was joined in this part of his dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist. See 107 S. 
Ct. at 2823. . 
35. 107 S. Ct. at 2824 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
36. 107 S. Ct. at 2824. 
37. 107 S. Ct. at 2824. 
38. 107 S. Ct. at 2824. 
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result in taxation of more than 100 percent of [a] firm's net income."39 
But where a "tax is assessed not on unitary income but on discrete 
events such as sale, manufacture, and delivery, which can occur in a 
single State or in different States, that apportionment principle is not 
applicable; there is simply no unitary figure or event to apportion."4-0 
Rather than expand Armco's holding to "revolutionize the law of state 
taxation,"41 Scalia would have adhered to "our long tradition of judg-
ing State taxes on their own terms"42 and would not "strik[e] them 
down on the-basis of assumptions as to what other States might do."43 
D. American Trucking Associations v. Scheiner 
On the same day it rendered its decision in Tyler Pipe, the Court 
elaborated further on the "internal consistency" doctrine in American 
Trucking Associations v. Scheiner, 44 which invalidated Pennsylvania's 
lump-sum annual taxes on the operation of trucks in the state. The 
taxes at issue were an axle tax ranging from $72 to $180 per truck and 
a $25 identification marker fee. The truckers attacked these levies 
under the commerce clause on the ground, among others, that they 
imposed a multiple tax burden on interstate commerce.45 If Penn-
sylvania had the right to impose a fiat tax on their operations, the 
truckers claimed, then so could every other state, and the cumulative 
consequences of such a regime would impose a crippling financial bur-
den on interstate motor carriers.46 In addressing this contention, the 
Court returned again to the principle of "internal consistency" - "the 
test ... that we have applied in other contexts."47 
Before putting the challenged exactions to the test, the Court ap-
39. 107 S. Ct. at 2824. 
40. 107 S. Ct. at 2824-25. 
41. 107 S. Ct. at 2825. 
42. 107 S. Ct. at 2826. 
43. 107 S. Ct. at 2826 (emphasis in original). 
44. 107 S. Ct. 2829 (1987). In the interest of full disclosure, it should be noted that I served 
as counsel to the American Trucking Associations in the Scheiner case. The views expressed 
here, however, are my own and do not necessarily represent those of the American Trucking 
Associations. 
45. The truckers' other principal argument was that the taxes discriminated against inter-
state commerce by imposing a substantially higher effective tax rate on trucks registered outside 
the state than on trucks registered in the state. Because flat taxes are not levied in proportion to 
the extent of a vehicle's use of a state's roads, they result in lower per mile costs for heavy users 
than for light users of the state's highways. Because the average Pennsylvania-registered truck 
used the state's roads more extensively than the average out-of-state truck, the lower effective tax 
rate inured to the benefit of the local trucker by comparison to his out-of-state counterpart. 
46. Brieffor American Trucking Associations at 35, American Trucking Assns. v. Scheiner, 
107 S. Ct. 2829 (1987) (No. 86-357). 
47. 107 S. Ct. at 2840. 
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plied the test to the registration fees and fuel consumption taxes that 
all states impose on the trucking industry. Although registration fees 
can be characterized as fl.at taxes imposed by every state, they never-
theless pass the "internal consistency" test because, as a result of reci-
procity and apportionment provisions, 48 they do not impose 
cumulative tax burdens upon the interstate carrier not borne by its 
intrastate competitor. 
Under this test, even though the registration fee is assessed, as indeed it 
has been, by ev~ry jurisdiction, it causes no impermissible interference 
with free trade because every State respects the registration of every 
other State. Payment of one registration fee enables a carrier to operate 
a vehicle either locally or in the interstate market. Having paid one re-
gistration fee, a vehicle may pass among the States as freely as it may 
roam the State in which it is based; the Commerce Clause is not offended 
when state boundaries are economically irrelevant.49 
Motor fuel taxes imposed by Pennsylvania likewise passed the "in-
ternal consistency" test even though they were imposed by every juris-
diction. Because they are apportioned to mileage in Pennsylvania, 
they impose no greater burden on the interstate than on the intrastate 
carrier. Each pays the same amount "for traveling a certain distance 
that happens to be within Pennsylvania."50 
But Pennsylvania's fl.at taxes for the use of its roads failed the "in-
ternal consistency" test. Payment of the fl.at taxes to Pennsylvania, 
unlike payment of registration fees, provided no immunity from pay-
ment of similar taxes imposed by other states. Nor were fl.at taxes, 
unlike motor fuel taxes, apportioned to some neutral factor like extent 
of road use, which made state lines irrelevant. While registration fees 
and motor fuel taxes could thus be replicated by every state without 
putting the interstate carrier at a competitive disadvantage, the same 
could not be said of unapportioned fl.at taxes. "If each State imposed 
flat taxes for the privilege of making commercial entrances into its 
territory, there is no conceivable doubt that commerce among the 
States would be deterred."51 
48. Reciprocity agreements among the states grant owners of vehicles paying registration fees 
to one state the privilege of operating over the highways of other states. In addition, many states 
participate in the International Registration Plan under which registration fees paid for a truck 
are apportioned among member states in accordance with the number of miles driven by the 
truck in each state. See Scheiner, 107 S. Ct. at 2834. 
49. 107 S. Ct. at 2840. 
50. 107 S. Ct. at 2840. 
51. 107 S. Ct. at 2840. The Court in Scheiner reaffirmed its view expressed in Armco and 
Tyler Pipe that the application of the "internal consistency" test does not depend on whether 
states other than the taxing state have in fact imposed similar taxes so as to place an actual 
burden on interstate commerce. 107 S. Ct. at 2841. Yet it went on to note that other states had 
in fact adopted flat taxes so that the threat to free trade was in no sense hypothetical. Moreover, 
some states had adopted retaliatory taxes assessed on motor vehicles based in Pennsylvania or 
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Dissenting from the Court's opinion in Scheiner, Justice Scalia reit-
erated his view expressed in Tyler Pipe that the "internal consistency" 
test was neither grounded in the Constitution nor compelled by the 
Court's precedents.52 This time Justice Scalia's sentiments were 
shared not only by Chief Justice Rehnquist, who joined his dissenting 
opinion in Tyler Pipe, 53 but also, in a separate dissenting opinion, by 
Justices O'Connor and Powell.54 In her dissenting opinion, Justice 
O'Connor refused to "read Armco as establishing a grandiose version 
of the 'internal consistency test' as the constitutional measure of all 
state taxes under the Commerce Clause."55 She read Armco as estab-
lishing at most "that a tax that is facially discriminatory is unconstitu-
tional if it is not 'internally consistent,' " 56 and would in no event 
extend the "internal consistency" principle to nondiscriminatory 
taxes. "Creating an 'internal consistency' rule of general application," 
concluded Justice O'Connor, was "an entirely novel enterprise that the 
Court undertakes for the first time in this case." The Court, in her 
judgment, offered "no reason why such a rule is necessary or 
desirable. "57 
II. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE "INTERNAL 
CONSISTENCY" DOCTRINE 
The Court's apparent embrace of the "internal consistency" doc-
trine has consequences far beyond its immediate impact on the taxes at 
issue in Armco, Tyler Pipe, and Scheiner. In the course of its opinions 
in these cases, the Court disapproved a number of precedents sus-
taining taxes that fail the "internal consistency" test. Moreover, the 
Court's adoption of "internal consistency" as a general principle of 
commerce clause adjudication places many other state tax levies under 
a constitutional cloud. 
A. The Precedents Disapproved by the Court 
1. General Motors Corporation v. Washington 
Twenty-three years before it struck down Washington's B & 0 tax 
other flat tax states, and these levies threatened to "divide and disrupt the market for interstate 
transportation services." 107 S. Ct. at 2841. 
S2. 107 S. Ct. at 28Sl (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
S3. See text at note 34 supra. 
S4. 107 S. Ct. at 2848-Sl (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist also joined this 
opinion. 
SS. 107 S. Ct. at 28SO. 
S6. 107 S. Ct. at 28SO. 
S1. 107 S. Ct. at 28SO. 
October 1988) Commerce Clause Restraint on State Taxation 149 
in Tyler Pipe, the Supreme Court sustained the application of the tax 
to an out-of-state manufacturer making wholesale sales in the state. In 
General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 58 the Court held that neither the 
commerce clause nor the due process clause was ·offended by the 
state's levy of a tax on General Motors' gross receipts from sales to 
Washington dealers. The Court's opinion made no reference to the 
doctrine of "internal consistency," which would remain in gestation 
for another two decades. Interestingly enough, however, Justice 
Goldberg's dissent in General Motors articulated such a doctrine in 
substance. 
Justice Goldberg observed that Washington's B & 0 tax had at one 
time exempted Washington manufacturer/wholesalers from the state's 
wholesaling tax under its "multiple activities" exemption. Anticipat-
ing the Supreme Court's decision in Armco, the Washington Supreme 
Court struck down the tax in 1948 on the ground that it discriminated 
against interstate commerce by taxing wholesale sales by out-of-state 
manufacturers to Washington purchasers, while exempting wholesale 
sales by Washington manufacturers to Washington purchasers.59 
Washington thereupon amended its "multiple activities" exemption to 
provide that local manufacturer/wholesalers would be subject to the 
wholesaling tax but exempt from the manufacturing tax. In Justice 
Goldberg's judgment, this cosmetic change in tlJ.e Washington scheme 
"would seem to have essentially the same economic effect on interstate 
sales but has the advantage of appearing nondiscriminatory."60 As 
Justice Goldberg explained, , 
[e]ven under the amended "multiple activities" exemption, ... an out-of-
state firm manufacturing goods in a State having the same taxation pro-
visions as does Washington would be subjected to two taxes on interstate 
sales to Washington customers. The firm would pay the producing State 
a local manufacturing tax measured by sales receipts and would also pay 
Washington a tax on wholesale sales to Washington residents. Under 
such taxation programs, if an out-of-state manufacturer competes with a 
Washington manufacturer, the out-of-state manufacturer may be seri-
ously disadvantaged by the duplicative taxation.61 
The Court's response to Justice Golberg's con:µnerce clause objec-
tion was that the taxpayer had failed to "demonstrat[e] what definite 
burden, in a constitutional sense"62 any other states' taxes had im-
posed on the activities taxed by Washington. "In such cases," the 
58. 377 U.S. 436 (1964). 
59. Columbia Steel Co. v. State, 30 Wash. 2d 658, 664, 192 P.2d 976, 979 (1948). 
60. General Motors, 377 U.S. at 460 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
61. 377 U.S. at 460. 
62. 377 U.S. at 449. 
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Court declared, "we have refrained from passing on the question of 
'multiple taxation.' " 63 In other words, because the taxpayer had not 
shown that Washington's tax, considered in conjunction with other 
states' taxes, had in fact subjected the interstate manufacturer/whole-
saler to a tax burden on its manufacturing-wholesaling activities 
greater than that imposed on its intrastate counterpart's manufactur-
ing-wholesaling activities, the taxpayer had no constitutionally cogni-
zable claim. 
Justice Goldberg's dissent in General Motors was rehabilitated in 
Tyler Pipe. The Court in Armco had relied on the dissent for its con-
demnation of Washington's earlier taxing scheme, which, as noted 
above, 64 was identical to West Virginia's. 65 In Tyler Pipe, the Court 
came full circle and adopted Justice Goldberg's views in their entirety. 
It declared that its reliance on Justice Golberg's opinion in Armco 
compelled it to "agree with Justice Goldberg's conclusion that the ex-
emption before us is the practical equivalent of the exemption that the 
Washington Supreme Court invalidated in 1948.''66 To the extent that 
General Motors was inconsistent· with this conclusion, it was 
overruled. 67 
2. The ''Flat Tax" Precedents 
In Scheiner, as in Armco and Tyler Pipe, there was little doubt that 
a straightforward application of the "internal consistency" principle to 
the taxes at issue would brand them as unconstitutional. Indeed, Jus-
tice Scalia's dissent in Tyler Pipe, while castigating the Court for its 
adoption of the "internal consistency" test, nevertheless conceded that 
"[i]t is clear . . . that . . . any unapportioned flat tax on multistate 
activities, such as the axle tax or marker fee at issue in Scheiner"68 
would fail the test. The real problem the Court confronted in 
Scheiner, therefore, was not whether flat taxes for highway use could 
survive commerce clause scrutiny under the "internal consistency" 
criterion. Rather, it was how to deal with the fact that the Court had 
previously considered and squarely rejected commerce clause attacks 
on such taxes. 
In a series of cases decided between 1935 and 1950, the Court up-
held fiat taxes for highway use in the face of the contention that such 
63. 377 U.S. at 449. 
64. See text at note 59 supra. 
65. Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 642 (1984). 
66. Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington Dept. of Revenue, 107 S. Ct. 2810, 2817 (1987). 
67. 107 S. Ct. at 2820. 
68. 107 S. Ct. at 2824 (Scalia J., dissenting). 
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taxes violated the commerce clause because they were not propor-
tional to the vehicle's use of the roads in the state. 69 In sustaining 
these taxes, the Court reasoned that taxes precisely calibrated to wear 
and tear of the highways by a particular vehicle-would not be adminis-
tratively feasible; that the taxes at issue were imposed for the privilege 
of using the highways rather than their actual use, and out-of-state 
vehicle owners could not complain if they failed to avail themselves of 
the opportunity to use the roads as much as in-state vehicle owners; 
and that the taxes at issue were not burdensome to interstate carri-
ers. 70 If these precedents were good law, then the "internal consis-
tency" principle - at least in its broad configuration - was not. 
Forced to choose between its old and its new doctrine, the Court 
chose the latter. The Court observed that the holdings of many of the 
earlier flat highway tax cases turned on the fact that the taxes were 
exacted in consideration for the "privilege" of using the state's high-
ways, a taxable "local" subject, rather than the privilege of doing in-
terstate business.71 In recent years, however, the Court has taken 
considerable pains to discredit the privilege doctrine and to eliminate 
it from commerce clause analysis. 72 Thus, the Court concluded that 
the precedents upholding fiat taxes can no longer support the broad 
proposition . . . that every fiat tax for the privilege of using a State's 
highways must be upheld even if it has a clearly discriminatory effect on 
commerce by reason of that commerce's interstate character. 73 
Despite the Court's disapproval of its fiat tax precedents, the Court 
did not completely jettison them. The Court recognized, as it had in 
its earlier decisions, that the commerce clause did not prevent the 
states from employing fiat taxes when they are the only practicable 
means of collecting revenue from highway users and when the use of 
69. See Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Commn., 295 U.S. 285 (1935) 
(Aero Mayflower I); Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of R.R. Commrs., 332 U.S. 495 (1947) 
(Aero Mayflower II); Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542 (1950). 
70. See Aero Mayflower I. 295 U.S. at 289; Aero Mayflower II. 332 U.S. at 503-04, 506 n.19; 
Capitol Greyhound Lines, 339 U.S. at 544, 546-47. Perhaps because the Court viewed the high-
way tax cases as sui generis, it never felt compelled in these cases to reconcile the results with its 
long line of precedents invalidating fiat fee drummers' license ta.lees as burdens on interstate 
commerce. See, e.g., Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946); Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 
311 U.S. 454 (1940); Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887). 
71. Scheiner, 107 S. Ct. at 2845-46. 
72. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 614-17 (1981) (overruling 
Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245 (1922)); Department of Revenue v. Association of 
Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 743-50 (1978) (overruling Joseph v. Carter & 
Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1947) and Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. State Tax 
Commn., 302 U.S. 90 (1937)); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 278-79 
(1977) (overruling Spector Motor Serv. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951)). 
73. Scheiner, 107 S. Ct. at 2847. In so holding, the Court finally reconciled its doctrine 
regarding fiat taxes on trucks with its doctrine regarding fiat taxes on drummers. 107 S. Ct. at 
2840 n.16; see note 70 supra. 
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more refined methods of taxation would impose genuine administra-
tive burdens. 74 Hence, the Court implicitly recognized that there are 
some limits to the "internal consistency" principle, even if Penn-
sylvania was in no position to invoke them.75 
3. Precedents Implicitly Disapproved by the Court 
While General Motors and the fiat highway tax cases were the only 
precedents that the Court explicitly disparaged in its "internal consis-
tency'' opinions, other precedents may now be of questionable force in 
light of Armco, Tyler Pipe, and Scheiner. Insofar as it sustained the 
application of Washington's B & 0 tax to an out-of-state manufacturer 
making wholesale sales in the state, Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. De-
partment of Revenue16 would no longer be followed. 77 Nor, presuma-
bly, would the Court's numerous decisions sustaining fiat license taxes 
on interstate enterprises.78 If every state imposed a fiat license tax on 
the activity in question, the resulting multiple tax burden imposed on 
the multistate enterprise engaged in such activity would place it at an 
obvious disadvantage to its intrastate competitor in violation of the 
"internal consistency" doctrine. 
Hinson v. Lott, 19 as suggested by Justice Scalia, so is another vener-
able precedent that has been und~rmined by the "internal consistency" 
principle. In Hinson, the Couit considered an Alabama tax of fifty 
cents per gallon upon spirituous liquor dealers "introducing any such 
74. 107 S. Ct. at 2847. 
75. Pennsylvania routinely used mileage figures to determine motor carriers' fuel taxes and 
their registration fees (when such fees are figured on an apportioned basis). It likewise appor-
tioned its corporate net income tax, imposed on interstate carriers on a mileage basis. Hence, 
under the facts of the case, the exception to the commerce clause bar against flat taxes for those 
justified by administrative necessity could not save Pennsylvania's levies, given the availability of 
administrative machinery "capable of taking into account at least the gross variations in cost per 
unit of highway usage between Pennsylvania-based and out-of-state carriers." 107 S. Ct. at 2847. 
76. 419 U.S. 560 (1975). 
77. In Tyler Pipe, the Court referred to Standard Pressed Steel as a case that stood for the 
proposition, which was subsequently repudiated, that a taxpayer must "prove that specific inter-
state transactions were subjected to multiple taxation in order to advance a claim of discrimina-
tion." Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington Dept. of Revenue, 107 S. Ct. 2810, 2817 (1987). See 
generally Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business and the Supreme Court, 1974 Term: 
Standard Pressed Steel and Colonial Pipeline, 62 VA. L. REv. 149 (1976) [hereinafter Heller-
stein, Interstate Business]. 
78. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Willett Co., 344 U.S. 574 (1953) (sustaining over commerce 
clause objections flat license taxes on "carters" as applied to "carters" engaged in interstate com-
merce); Wagner v. City of Covington, 251 U.S. 95 (1919) (sustaining over commerce clause 
objections $150 license tax as applied to an interstate vendor of soft drinks); Browning v. City of 
Waycross, 233 U.S. 16 (1914) (sustaining over commerce clause objections $25 occupation tax as 
applied to local agent of interstate vendor of lightning rods). 
79. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 148 (1869). 
80. Tyler Pipe, 101 S. Ct. at 2824 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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liquors into the State for sale .... " 81 The Court acknowledged that 
"[i]f this section stood alone in the legislation of Alabama on the sub-
ject of taxing liquors,"82 it would discriminate against products of 
other states in violation of the commerce. clause. 83 The Court ob-
served, however, that other sections of the statute imposed a tax of 
fifty cents per gallon upon whiskey and brands from fruits manufac-
tured in the state. Viewed in light of this "complementary" tax, 84 the 
tax on out-of-state liquor was sustained because it was, in the Court's 
judgment, part of a scheme that imposed an equal tax on all liquor 
sold in the state. 85 
Under the "internal consistency" doctrine, however, the taxing 
scheme in Hinson would not pass muster. The tax on out-of-state li-
quor in that case was imposed upon the seller, while the tax on local 
liquor was imposed upon the manufacturer. If such taxing provisions 
were in force in every state, the manufacturer selling- liquor across 
state lines would pay a tax to the state where the liquor was distilled 
and to the state where it was sold, whereas the wholly local enterprise, 
selling all its liquor in the state where it was distilled, would pay only 
the taA on manufacture. 
B. The Impact of the ''Internal Consistency" Doctrine on Existing 
State Tax Structures 
1. Unapportioned Flat Taxes 
Far more important than the "internal consistency" doctrine's im-
pact on individual Supreme Court precedents is its impact on existing 
state tax structures. Needless to say, fiat highway taxes are now vul-
nerable to constitutional attack, a point that has not been lost on the 
trucking industry. 86 More significantly, the imposition of any unap-
81. Hinson, 15 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 148 (quoting Act of Feb. 22, 1866, 1866 Ala. Acts) (empha-
sis omitted). 
82. 75 U.S. at 150. 
83. 75 U.S. at 152. 
84. 75 U.S. at 153. 
85. 75 U.S. at 153. See generally Hellerstein, Complementary Taxes, supra note 24. 
86. The attack is being vigorously waged by the trucking industry. See American Trucking 
Assn. v. Gray, 108 S. Ct. 2 (Blackmun, Circuit Justice 1987) (granting injunction requiring Ar-
kansas officials to establish escrow fund for tax payments pending challenge to state's flat high-
way tax); American Trucking Assns. v. Arkansas Highway and Transp. Dept., No. 85-101 (Mar. 
14, 1988) Ark. St. Tax Rep. ff200-16 (declaring flat highway tax unconstitutional); Common-
wealth Transp. Cabinet v. American Trucking Assns., 746 S.W.2d 65 (Ky. 1988) (declaring flat 
highway tax unconstitutional); Black Beauty Trucking, Inc. v. Indiana Dept. of State Revenue, 
No.49T05-8706-TA-00026 (Ind. Tax Ct. Jan. 7, 1988), reported in [Ind.] St. Tax Rep. (CCH) ff 
200-715; George Transfer, Inc. v. Indiana State Dept. of Revenue, No. 49T05-8706-TA-00027 
(Ind. Tax Ct. Jan. 7, 1988), reported in [Ind.] St. Tax Rep. (CCH) ff 200-715 (declaring flat 
highway tax unconstitutional); American Trucking Assns. v. Indiana Dept. of State Revenue, 
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portioned flat state or local tax on a multistate business would appear 
to be vulnerable to attack under the "internal consistency" doctrine, 
unless administrative considerations make "more finely calibrated" le-
vies "impracticable."87 This conclusion follows inexorably from a 
simple application of the "internal consistency" principle. If every 
state were to impose an unapportioned flat tax on business activities in 
which both intrastate and interstate enterprises engage, the interstate 
business would pay the tax in each state in which it did business, 
whereas its intrastate competitor would pay but a single tax in the 
state in which it did business. Because the tax is not apportioned to 
the activity carried on in the state, the interstate enterprise would bear 
a heavier tax burden than its intrastate competitor merely because it 
was engaged in interstate commerce - a paradigmatic "impermissible 
interference with free trade."88 
The implications of this conclusion are rather unsettling. Every 
state imposes initial fees and taxes on domestic and foreign corpora-
tions when first organizing or qualifying to do business in the state. 89 
Many of these levies are unapportioned flat taxes.90 Under the "inter-
nal consistency" doctrine, such levies may not survive commerce 
clause scrutiny. If every state were to impose an unapportioned flat 
tax for the privilege of engaging in business activity in the state,91 the 
interstate enterprise would bear ah additional tax burden simply be-
cause it was carrying on business across state lines and without regard 
512 N.E.2d 920 (Ind. Tax Court 1987) (ordering escrow for tax payments pending challenge to 
flat highway tax); National Private Trucking Assn. v. Indiana Dept. of State Revenue, 512 
N.E.2d 928 (Ind. Tax Court 1987) (ordering escrow for tax payments pending challenge to flat 
highway tax). American Trucking Assns. v. Conway, No. S-147-86W (Vt. Super. Ct. Feb. 11, 
1988), reported in Vt. St. Tax Rep. (CCH) 11 200-306 (declaring flat tax on trucks unconstitu-
tional and ordering refund of escrowed taxes). 
87. American Trucking Assns. v. Scheiner, 107 S. Ct. 2829, 2847 (1987). Justice Scalia ex-
plicitly recognized this point. See text at note 68 supra. 
88. Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644 (1984) quoted in text at note 26 supra; see 
Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1091, 1186 (1986). 
89. See 1 [All States] State Tax Guide (CCH) 11111-201 to 1-955 (Feb. 1988); All States Tax 
Guide (P-H) 11 211-A. The levies discussed in this and the next paragraph are presumed to be 
imposed for revenue purposes under the state's taxing power, as distinguished from fees that are 
imposed for regulatory purposes under the state's police powers. See 2 [All States] State Tax 
Guide (CCH) 1130-000, at 3011-12 (Mar. 1988). Regulatory fees are discussed in the succeeding 
paragraphs. See text following note 96 infra. 
90. See note 86 supra. Wholly apart from any "internal consistency" objection, many of 
these levies impose greater tax burdens on foreign than on domestic corporations, an apparent 
violation of the commerce, if not the equal protection, clause. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. 
Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985). But that is the subject of another article. 
91. There is no longer a per se objection under the commerce clause to imposing a tax on the 
privilege of doing business in the state as applied to an enterprise engaged exclusively in inter-
state commerce. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977) (overruling 
Spector Motor Serv. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951)). 
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to whether it was carrying on more or less business in the state than its 
intrastate competitor. Conceivably, such levies could be defended on 
the ground of administrative necessity - that it would be impractica-
ble to provide for their apportionment based on some neutral measure 
of the extent to which the enterprise has exploited the privilege of con-
ducting business in the state. These arguments have a hollow ring, 
however, at least in the overwhelming majority of states that tax in-
come, capital stock, or other bases, and provide, under constitutional 
compulsion, methods for apportioning the tax measure to the state. 92 
Another broad category of exactions that the "internal consis-
tency" doctrine places in constitutional jeopardy encompasses annual 
business license taxes imposed by states and localities for carrying on 
particular trades or occupations.93 Many of these are unapportioned 
fiat taxes.94 The hypothetical replication of these taxes by every state 
under the "internal consistency" doctrine imposes a cumulative tax 
burden upon the multistate enterprise not borne by its intrastate com-
petitor solely because the multistate business has chosen to do business 
in more than one state. For example, Alaska's twenty-five dollar an-
nual business license tax,95 if adopted by each of the other forty-nine 
states, would subject the enterprise doing business in fifty states to a 
$1250 tax burden, compared to its local competitor's twenty-five dol-
lar tax burden, even if the farmer's nationwide business was identical 
to the latter's in every respect except that it was conducted in fifty 
states instead of one. Although the assumption of identity between the 
interstate and intrastate business may be unrealistic, the implications 
92. It may be argued, contrary to the assumption made at the outset of this paragraph, see 
note 89 supra, that organization, initiation, or business qualification fees should not be treated as 
true revenue measures because they are more accurately viewed as components of the states' 
regulatory regimes governing corporations. As noted below, however, see text at notes 97-105 
infra, it is questionable whether this distinction would make a constitutional difference under 
"internal consistency" analysis, except in those cases in which it could be demonstrated that 
apportionment of the fees in question was administratively impracticable or that the fees in fact 
constituted user charges. See text at notes 104-11 infra. As a practical matter, however, there 
may be something to be said for a de minimis rule that removed modest corporate organization, 
initiation, or qualification fees from the "internal consistency" requirement. Unlike license fees, 
which are imposed annually and can be levied on a per store, per truck, or per location basis, 
these initial fees are imposed only once and on an enterprise-wide basis. 
93. See 2 [All States] State Tax Guide (CCH) ~~ 30-201 to 30-955 (Mar. 1988). 
94. See, e.g., ALA. CoDE §§ 40-12-1 to -206 (1985 & Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. §§ 205.013-
.1965 (1987); [Fla.) St. Tax Rep. (CCH) ~ 33-100; N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 105-33 (1985). A number 
of these flat business license taxes are graduated according to the gross receipts of the business, 
with the fixed fee increasing with the receipts of the business, usually up to a statutory maximum 
above a certain level of receipts. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§§ 47:354 to :357 (West Supp. 
1988). Although one can argue that such levies are apportioned to the business done in the state, 
insofar as the statutory maximum is not exceeded, once the maximum is exceeded a graduated 
flat tax is indistinguishable from an ungraduated flat tax for analytical purposes. 
95. Al.AsKA STAT. § 43.70.030 (1983). 
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of "internal consistency" analysis are inescapable.96 
A third category of unapportioned flat taxes that may be subject to 
constitutional attack under the "internal consistency" doctrine com-
prises the professional and similar licensing fees that are imposed by 
every state. Many of these fees are flat and unapportioned, and, for 
that reason, could be challenged under the "internal consistency" ra-
tionale set forth in the preceding paragraphs. One feature of these 
licensing fees, however, arguably insulates them from challenge under 
the "internal consistency" doctrine. In contrast to the exactions dis-
cussed above, which were presumed to be imposed for general revenue 
purposes pursuant to the state's taxing power,97 the levies considered 
here are presumed to be imposed for regulatory purposes pursuant to 
the state's police power. However thin that distinction may be in 
some cases, it is a distinction the law recognizes,98 and the question for 
present purposes is whether it is a distinction that makes a constitu-
tional difference insofar as commerce clause (and "internal consis-
tency") analysis is concerned: 
The issue whether an exaction is a "tax" or a "fee" arises in a 
variety of contexts. Courts have had to determine whether charges by 
federal agencies are authorized fees for benefits granted99 or are in sub-
stance taxes that can be imposed only by Congress' exercise of its tax-
ing power. 100 They have had to determine whether levies are taxes 
subject to priority in bankruptcy proceedings or are fees not entitled to 
such priority. 101 And they have had to determine whether exactions 
are taxes subject to states' constitutional requirements of uniformity 
and equality or are fees not subject to such requirements. 102 There is 
no doubt in these cases, however, that the levy, if not an exercise of 
governmental tax power is nevertheless an exercise of governmental 
96. Although the level of Alaska's tax might preclude, as a practical matter, any legal chal· 
lenge to the levy. Compare CAL. REv. & TAX CoDE § 23151 (West Supp. 1988), which imposes 
a minimum $300 annual corporate franchise tax that will increase to $800 by 1990. Wholly apart 
from "internal consistency" analysis, one might argue that levies such as Alaska's and Califor· 
nia's are inconsistent with the analysis in the cases invalidating flat taxes on drummers. See notes 
70 & 73 supra. 
97. See note 89 supra. 
98. See notes 99-102 infra and accompanying text. 
99. See 31 U.S.C. § 9701 (1982) (delegating to administrative agencies the authority to assess 
charges in situations where "a service or thing of value" is provided by the agency). 
100. See Federal Power Commn. v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345 (1974); National 
Cable Television Assn. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974). 
101. See In re Jenny Lynn Mining Co., 780 F.2d 585, 588-89 (6th Cir. 1986); In re Lorber 
Indus., 675 F.2d 1062 (9th Cir. 1982). 
102. See City of Fairmont v. Pitrolo Pontiac-Cadillac, 308 S.E.2d 527 (W. Va. 1983), cert. 
denied, 466 U.S. 958 (1984) ("fire service fee" constitutes ad valorem property tax); Newman v. 
City of Indianola, 232 N.W.2d 568 (Iowa 1975) (special assessment for local improvement does 
not constitute tax). 
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regulatory power. Because the commerce clause applies to state regu-
lation as well as to state taxation, the only question raised by the tax-
versus-fee issue in the present context is whether the "internal consis-
tency" doctrine is limited in application to levies that are determined 
to be taxes. 
Although the Court's formal criteria for evaluating commerce 
clause challenges to state regulations are not identical to its criteria for 
evaluating commerce clause challenges to state taxation, 103 there is no 
reason to believe that a regulatory license fee would be immune from 
the "internal consistency" requirement merely because it constituted 
an exercise of the state's regulatory power rather than an exercise of 
the state's taxing power. Surely the evils that the "internal consis-
tency" test was designed to combat are the same regardless of whether 
the unapportioned flat levy is an exercise of the tax power or the regu-
latory power. In each case, the licensee carrying on his trade in more 
than one jurisdiction bears a greater financial burden than his intra-
state competitor merely because he is engaging in interstate commerce 
with the consequent interference with free trade among the states. 
Hence there does not appear to be any sound policy basis for distin-
guishing the "fee" from the "tax" cases insofar as the application of 
the "internal consistency" doctrine is concerned. 
Despite the general vulnerability of unapportioned flat taxes to 
commerce clause challenge under the "internal consistency" principle, 
not every unapportioned flat tax would fail to pass muster. As noted 
above, 104 when administrative considerations preclude the imposition 
of more refined levies, unapportioned flat taxes may be constitutionally 
tolerable. Moreover, if an unapportioned flat tax in fact constitutes a 
user fee imposed by the taxing authority as a charge for the use of 
public services or facilities, and if the fee is neither discriminatory nor 
excessive, it will not offend the "internal consistency" doctrine. 105 
In Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority District v. Delta Air-
lines, 106 for example, the Court sustained the authority of two munici-
pal airports to impose flat service fees of one dollar for each passenger 
boarding a commercial aircraft operating from the airports. As the 
Court explained, the levies satisfied the requirements of nondiscrimi-
nation and reasonableness: 
First, neither fee discriminates against interstate commerce and travel. 
103. See Hellerstein, Hughes v. Oklahoma: The Court, the Commerce Clause, and State Con-
trol of Natural Resources, 1979 SUP. Cr. REV. 51, 65 n.80. 
104. See text at notes 74-75 supra. 
105. See American Trucking Assns. v. Scheiner, 107 S. Ct. 2829, 2843-44 (1987). 
106. 405 U.S. 707 (1972). 
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While the vast majority of passengers who board flights at the airports 
involved are traveling interstate, both interstate and intt:astate flights are 
subject to the same charges. Furthermore, there is no showing of any 
inherent difference between these two classes of flights, such that the 
application of the same fee to both would amount to discrimination 
against one or the other. 
Second, these charges reflect a fair, if imperfect approximation of the 
use of facilities for whose benefit they are imposed.101 
Even if every state (or locality) imposed such a fee, there would be no 
impermissible interference with interstate commerce in violation of the 
"internal consistency" doctrine: ·both interstate and intrastate passen-
gers would pay according to their use of the facilities, and, although 
the facilities were used primarily by interstate passengers, the charge 
itself would reasonably approximate the value of the use - so inter-
state passengers would not be subsidizing governmental services that 
would be of primary benefit to local interests. 
Few of the unapportioned flat taxes described above could satisfy 
the criteria set forth in the Evansville-Vanderburgh case. In the first 
place, they cannot fairly be characterized as user charges in the sense 
of specific charges imposed by the taxing authority for the use of pub-
licly owned or publicly provided facilities or services.108 Moreover, 
even if so characterized, it would be difficult to demonstrate that the 
unapportioned flat taxes considered above - such as corporate qualifi-
cation levies or annual business license taxes - constitute a "fair ... 
approximation of the use of facilities for whose benefit they are im-
posed"109 when they are not identified with the use of any particular 
facilities and are typically paid into the state's general fund. Further-
more, the taxes would in many instances be discriminatory in the sense 
that whatever "benefit" is purchased by the levy, the intrastate tax-
payer would enjoy more of it than the interstate taxpayer because of its 
relatively greater in-state activity. 110 Thus in Scheiner, the Court 
pointed out that the flat taxes at issue satisfied neither of the two spe-
cific conditions of nondiscrimination and reasonableness imposed by 
Evansville-Vanderburgh: "They discriminate against out-of-state vehi-
cles by subjecting them to a much higher charge per mile traveled in 
107. 405 U.S. at 717 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original), quoted in Scheiner, 107 S. Ct. 
at 2843-44. 
108. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 621 (1981). 
109. Evansville-Vanderburgh, 405 U.S. at 717. 
110. This is, of course, a factual question. If it could be shown that the out-of-state business 
engages in no less commercial activity in the state than its intrastate competitor, the levy would 
not be discriminatory. One should not lose sight of the fact, however, that the Court developed 
the requirement that taxes must be fairly apportioned to the taxpayer's activities in the state in 
part because such equivalence between interstate and local commerce cannot be assumed. 
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the State, and they do not even purport to approximate fairly the cost 
or value of the use of Pennsylvania's roads."111 
2. Other Unapportioned Taxes 
Unapportioned flat taxes are not the only levies threatened by the 
"internal consistency" doctrine. Any unapportioned tax imposed on 
events or activities that can occur in more than one state would like-
wise be subject to attack under the "internal consistency" principle. 
For example, compensating use taxes112 imposed by states that do not 
grant a credit for sales or use taxes paid to other states, 113 cannot with-
stand scrutiny under the internal consistency doctrine. Use taxes are 
typically levied on "the storage, use or other consumption" of tangible 
personal property in the state and are measured by the sales price of 
the property.114 If replicated by every state, these levies would put the 
enterprise doing business across state lines at a competitive disadvan-
tage to its wholly intrastate competitor. 
If one views use taxes in conjunction with the sales taxes for which 
they compensate, the sales-use tax scheme would subject the purchase 
111. Scheiner, 107 S. Ct. at 2844. 
112. Compensating use taxes, which are functionally equivalent and complementarY to sales 
taxes, see Hellerstein, Complementary Taxes, supra note 24, at 406-09, were developed to meet 
two problems created by the states' enactment of Sales taxes. Because constitutional strictures 
prohibited the states from taxing sales consummated outside their borders or in interstate com-
merce, states feared that local merchants would lose business when prospective purchasers made 
out-of-state purchases to avoid sales tax liability. In addition, the states feared they would lose 
revenue as a result of the diversion of sales to nontaxing states. Compensating use taxes ad-
dressed these concerns by imposing a levy on the "use" in the state of tangible personal property 
that has not already been subjected to a sales tax in the state. The use tax is equal in amount to 
the sales 'tax that w_ould have been imposed on the sale of the property in question if the sale had 
occurred within the state's taxing jurisdiction. The state overcomes the constitutional hurdle of 
taxing an out-of-state or interstate sale by imposing a tax on a subject within its taxing power -
the local "use" of property. In principle, then, the in-state consumer stands to gain nothing by 
making an out-of-state purchase free of sales tax because he will ultimately be saddled with an 
identical use tax when the property is brought into the taxing state. Use taxes discriminate on 
their face against interstate commerce because they apply only to goods purchased outside the 
state. Any in-state purchase would already have been subjected to sales tax and thus have been 
exempted from use tax. The Court nevertheless sustained the constitutionality of the use tax 
because it viewed the use tax, in conjunction with the sales tax, as imposing an equal burden on 
out-of-state and local purchases. See Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937). See 
generally Hellerstein, Complementary Taxes, supra note 24. 
113. Nevada grants no such credit. See McCray, Commerce Clause Sanctions Against Taxa-
tion on Mail Order Sales: A Re-Evaluation, 17 URB. LAW. 529, 532 n.5 (1985). ,Wyoming law 
provides for no such credit, although as a matter of administrative practice the Department of 
Revenue and Taxation recognizes a credit for sales taxes, but not for use taxes, paid to other 
states. [Wyo.] St. & Loe. Tax Serv. [P-H] 11 21,362. Prior to 1988, South Carolina granted no 
such credit. While now permitting a credit for sales taxes paid to other states, South Carolina 
continues to deny credit for use taxes paid to another state. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-6 (S.C. Tax 
Commn. Feb. 10, 1988) S.C. St. Tax Rep. 11200-227. See S.C. CODE REGS. 117-174,66 (1976); 
s.c. CooE ANN. § 12-35-815 (Supp. 1987). 
114. See, e.g .• NEV. REV. STAT. § 372.185 (1987). 
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of goods in one state for use in another to two exactions - a sales tax 
in the state of purchase and a use tax in the state of use. The purchase 
of goods for local use, however, would be subjected to only a sales 
tax.115 
If one views use taxes in isolation from sales taxes, use taxes would 
still subject the interstate business to the risk of multiple taxation not 
borne by its intrastate competitor. The interstate business using prop-
erty in two or more states would pay a tax in each state in which the 
property was used whereas the intrastate business using the property 
in an identical fashion, except that it was not transported across state 
lines, would pay but a single tax. Under either view of the use tax, the 
"impermissible interference with free trade"116 is self-evident. 
The overwhelming majority of states avoid any "internal consis-
tency" objection to their use taxes by providing a credit for sales or use 
taxes paid to other states.117 They thus assure that the sale or ·use of 
property is in principle taxed just once whether or not it crosses state 
lines. 118 The Supreme Court, at least up to now, has expressly re-
frained from holding that the states are constitutionally required to 
115. One might argue that use truces violate the commerce clause wholly apart from any 
"internal consistency" objection because they apply only to goods that are purchased outside the 
state and used within it. See note 112 supra. As noted above, however, the Court held that the 
apparent discrimination disappears when use truces are considered in conjunction with sales taxes 
that place an equivalent burden on goods purchased locally. If states imposed two wholly in-
dependent levies on the sale and use of goods within the state, no commerce clause claim, based 
on "internal consistency" or other objections, could be raised to the resulting true consequences. 
Purchasers of goods in one state for use in another would pay a sales true to the state of purchase 
and a use true to the state of use; purchasers of goods for local use would pay both a sales tax and 
a use true to the same state. 
116. Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644 (1984). 
117. See All States Tax Guide (P-H) ~ 256; McCray, supra note 113, at 532. 
118. In practice, trucation of the use of property by more than one state can occur if states 
have inconsistent schemes for granting credits for use truces paid to other states. See generally 
McCray, supra note 113, at 531-36. Most states impose use truces only ifthe taxpayer first uses 
the property within their jurisdiction and grant a credit for use taxes paid to another state only if 
that other state was the state of first use. Id. at 533 n.7. Some states, however, impose a use tax 
on the use of property within their jurisdiction, even though the property was first used in an-
other state, so long as the trucpayer has not previously paid a use tax with respect to that property 
to some other state. Id. at 533 n.8. Hence when the property is subjected to use tax in a state 
that follows the rule of "first collection," and that state is not the state of first use, the taxpayer 
will be subject to double taxation if a state in which the property was first used follows the rule of 
"first use" and asserts liability on that basis without allowing a credit for the tax paid to the state 
of subsequent use. 
This is not an "internal consistency" problem, however. Both of the crediting schemes de-
scribed above are "internally consistent" in the sense that, if adopted by every jurisdiction, use 
true would be due to only one state - either the state of first use or the state of first collection. 
The problem of multiple taxation resulting from different, but internally consistent, crediting 
schemes is therefore analogous to the problem of multiple taxation resulting from varying, but 
internally consistent apportionment formulas, see text at notes 9-19 supra, and would probably 
not give rise to a commerce clause objection. Cf Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 
(1978). 
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grant such a credit.119 The Court's embrace of the "internal consis-
tency" doctrine, however, may be fairly regarded as resolving the 
issue.120 
Like use truces that provide no credit for sales or use taxes paid to 
other states, New York's stock transfer true runs into constitutional 
difficulties under the "internal consistency" doctrine. The levy is im-
posed on "all sales, or agreements to sell, or memoranda of sales and 
all deliveries or transfers of shares or certificates of stock"121 in any 
foreign or domestic corporation at a fixed rate per share, graduated 
according to the price of the share. The true applies if any one of the 
five raxable events occurs in New York, regardless of where the rest of 
the transaction takes place, and if more than one taxable event occurs 
in the state, only one true is payable on the entire transaction.122 If 
every state were to adopt such a taxing scheme, the taxpayer making 
an interstate trade123 would pay two or more taxes whereas a taxpayer 
making a wholly local trade would pay but a single rax. 124 The "im-
permissible interference with free trade"125 under the "internal consis-
tency'' doctrine is again apparent. 126 
119. Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 21-22 (1985); Southern Pac. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 
U.S. 167, 172 (1939); Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 587 (1937). 
120. Justice Scalia certainly thinks it did. See Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington Dept. of 
Revenue, 107 S. Ct. 2810, 2824 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Although Professors Nowak and 
Rotunda have argued that the states are not required to grant a credit for sales or use taxes paid 
to other states against their own use taxes, Nowak & Rotunda, Sales and Use Tax Credits, Dis-
crimination Against Interstate Commerce, and the Useless Multiple Tax Concept, 20 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 273 (1987), and that Armco "only superficially appears to support a multiple taxation 
challenge" to the failure to grant such a credit, id. at 310, their argument loses much of its force 
after Tyler Pipe and Scheiner. Even before the emergence of the "internal consistency" doctrine, 
moreover, both courts and commentators had concluded that the failure of a state to grant a 
credit against its use tax for sales or use taxes paid to other states would violate the commerce 
clause. See Montgomery Ward & Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 272 Cal. App. 2d 728, 78 Cal. 
Rptr. 373 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1040 (1970); McCray, supra note 113, at 564; Develop-
ments in the Law: Federal Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate Business, 75 HARV. L. 
REV. 953, 999-1000 (1962). 
121. N.Y. TAX LAW§ 270(1) (McKinney 1986). 
122. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 440.2 (1976). 
123. For example, a sale on the Boston Stock Exchange of shares to be delivered in New 
York. 
124. Indeed, as many as five states could in principle tax the same transaction if each of the 
five events - the sale, the agreement to sell, the memorandum of the sale, the delivery of the 
shares, and the transfer of the shares (on the transfer agent's books)- were to occur in a differ-
ent state. However, federal law prohibits a state from taxing a change in the beneficial or record 
ownership of securities merely because the transfer agent's facilities are located in the taxing 
state. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(d) (1982). 
125. Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644 (1984). 
126. In 1977, the Supreme Court struck down a provision of New York's stock transfer tax 
that discriminated against interstate commerce by providing lower rates for certain trades made 
on the New York Stock Exchange. See Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Commn., 429 U.S. 318 
(1977). These provisions were subsequently repealed. 1977 N.Y. Laws 878. In his dissenting 
opinion in Tyler Pipe, Justice Scalia pointed out that the pre-1968 version of New York's stock 
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One final example of an existing taxing scheme that appears to vio-
late the "internal consistency" principle is Florida's intangible prop-
erty tax. The tax is imposed at the rate of one mill ($1 per $1,000) on 
all intangible property, except for obligations secured by Florida re-
alty.127 As construed by the Florida courts, the tax applies to intangi-
ble property owned by taxpayers domiciled in the state, whether or not 
the property has acquired a business situs12s in Florida,129 as well as to 
intangible property owned by taxpayers domiciled outside of Florida 
when the property has acquired a business situs in the state.130 Ac-
cording to the Florida court, 
[t]he taxation of aecounts receivable by a state in which a corporation 
has acquired a business situs131 does not preclude the corporation domi-
ciliary state from also levying an intangible tax on accounts receivable, 
as a corporation must pay its share of the cost of government to the 
sovereign from which it derives its very existence.132 
Although the Florida court's statement accurately reflects the 
Supreme Court's reading of the due process clause, which does not 
prevent two states from imposing a tax upon the same intangible prop-
erty, 133 it.is questionable whether it can survive the Court's reading of 
the commerce clause as expressed in the "internal consistency" princi-
ple. If every state adopted an intangible property tax that applied both 
to property owned by its domiciliaries and to property with a business 
transfer tax, which in pertinent part resembles the existing levy, was characterized by the Court 
in Boston Stock Exchange as " 'neutral as to in-state and out-of-state sales.' " Tyler Pipe Indus. 
v. Washington Dept. of Revenue, 107 S. Ct. 2810, 2824 n.2 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quot· 
ing Boston Stock Exchange, 429 U.S. at 330). Scalia went on to observe, however, that this was 
"plainly not true if internal consistency is a requirement of neutrality: assuming that all States 
had New York's pre-1968 scheme, if sale and delivery both took place in New York, there would 
be a single tax, while if sale took place in New York and delivery in New Jersey, there would be 
double taxation." 107 S. Ct. at 2824 n.2. The problem with New York's stock transfer tax can 
also be viewed as a species of the multiple activities exemption considered in Armco and Tyler 
Pipe. Taxpayers who engage in more than one taxable activity in New York are exempt from tax 
on more than one taxable activity. See text at notes 212-31 infra. 
127. FLA. STAT. § 199.032 (1987). 
128. Intangibles have historically been taxable at the domicile of their owner under the doc· 
trine of mobilia sequuntur personam (movables follow the person). The Supreme Court, how-
ever, has "recognize[d] the principle that choses in action may acquire a situs for taxation other 
than at the domicile of their owner if they have become integral parts of some local business." 
Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204, 213 (1930). 
129. Florida Steel Corp. v. Dickinson, 308 So. 2d 623 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 
319 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1975), ajfd., 328 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1976). 
130. Allis-Chalmers Credit Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 456 So. 2d 899 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App.), petition for review dismissed, 458 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 1984). 
131. It is the intangible property, not the corporation, that may acquire a "business situs" 
apart from the domicile of its owner. See, e.g., Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193 (1936). 
132. Florida Steel Corp., 308 So. 2d at 626. See also National Linen Serv. Corp. v. Thomp-
son, 103 Ga. App. 786, 120 S.E.2d 779 (1961). 
133. See State Tax Commn. v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942); Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 
357 (1939). 
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situs in the state, the enterprise domiciled in one state but employing 
intangible property in another, where it acquires a business situs, 
would pay two taxes on its intangibles whereas its wholly intrastate 
competitor would pay but one tax. Assuming that the Court would 
have little difficulty in concluding that such interference with inter-
state capital flows affected commerce so as to warrant commerce 
clause scrutiny,134 the "impermissible interference with free trade" 135 
under the "internal consistency" doctrine would be self-evident.136 
III. THE DEFENSIBILITY OF THE "INTERNAL 
CONSISTENCY" DOCTRINE 
A. ''Internal Consistency" and Commerce Clause Policy 
Assuming that the "internal consistency" doctrine is good law, the 
134. In recent years, the Court has flatly repudiated "any suggestion that a state tax or regu-
lation affecting interstate commerce is immune from Commerce Clause scrutiny because it at-
taches only to a 'local' or intrastate activity." Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 
609, 615 (1981). In Wilson v. Department of Revenue, 302 Or. 128, 727 P.2d 614 (1986) (en 
bane), the court held that the commerce clause was implicated by an Oregon income tax provi-
sion limiting nonrecognition of gain upon the conversion or exchange of real property to conver-
sions or exchanges in which the newly acquired property was situated in the state. The court 
declared that "[b]ecause capital investment is basic to a system of free trade, and because the 
framers intended to create an area of free trade under the Commerce Clause, a state law keeping 
investment capital, even for land, within the state can have a restrictive impact on capital mar-
kets and implicate the Commerce Clause." 302 Or. at 135, 727 P.2d at619. See also Dominion· 
Natl. Bank v. Olsen, 771 F.2d 108, 118 (6th Cir. 1985); Aronson v. Commonwealth, 401 Mass. 
244, 248-49, 516 N.E.2d 137, 140 (1987); Blumstein, Some Intersections of the Negative Com-
merce Clause and the New Federalism: The Case of Discriminatory State Income Tax Treatment 
of Out-of-State Tax-Exempt Bonds, 31 VAND. L. REV. 473, 562 (1978). 
135. Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644 (1984). 
136. The "internal consistency" doctrine likewise casts doubt upon the constitutionality of a 
state's taxing the entire income of domestic corporations doing business in other states while at 
the same time taxing an apportioned share of the income of foreign corporations doing business 
in the state. For many years, the view had been "widely held that the State of incorporation is 
free to impose a tax on the entire net income of a domestic corporation." SPECIAL SUBCOMM. 
ON STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE CoMMERCE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 
STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE, H.R. REP. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 160 
(1964); see also G. ALTMAN & F. KEESLING, ALLOCATION OF INCOME IN STATE TAXATION 31-
33 (2d ed. 1950). Wholly apart from the "internal consistency" doctrine, it is open to question 
whether this view can survive the Court's modern opinions sustaining a state's right to tax an 
apportioned share of a nondomiciliary corporation's income or property while rejecting the claim 
that the state of the corporation's domicile had the exclusive power to tax all such income or 
property. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 445-46 (1980); Japan Line, 
Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 441-44 (1979) (dictum); see Hellerstein, State 
Income Taxation, supra note 19, at 135-37. But see Commercial Credit Consumer Servs., Inc. v. 
Norberg, 518 A.2d 1336 (R.I. 1986) (sustaining over commerce clause objections state's imposi-
tion of tax on entire net income of domestic corporation carrying on substantial business outside 
the state). Assuming the states' power to tax their domestic corporations on their entire net 
income survived Mobil and Japan Line, however, the "internal consistency" doctrine would ap-
pear to bar a scheme that taxed domestic corporations on their entire income while taxing foreign 
corporations on an apportioned share of such income. If replicated by every state, the wholly 
intrastate CQrporation would pay tax on no more than 100% of its income whereas the corpora-
tion doing business in more than one state would pay tax on more than 100% of its income. 
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question remains whether it makes good sense. As a matter of theory, 
it is difficult to quarrel with the proposition that the commerce clause 
forbids taxes that penalize taxpayers merely because they do business 
across state lines. 137 And the "internal consistency" doctrine may be 
viewed as a logical corollary to that proposition. As the preceding 
discussion has made clear, unapportioned taxes in general, and unap-
portioned flat taxes in particular, can place a burden on the interstate 
business that is not borne by its intrastate competitor - a burden at-
tributable solely to the fact that the interstate business plies its trade in 
more than one state. If the "internal consistency" doctrine functions 
as a mechanism for invalidating such levies - and it does, the doc-
trine serves a central purpose of the commerce clause. 
The difficulties with the "internal consistency" doctrine lie in its 
problematic implications for commerce clause analysis rather than in 
the commerce clause policies it plainly serves. Aside from Justice 
Scalia's skepticism over the "theoretical underpinning for judicial 'en-
forcement' of the Commerce Clause,"138 no sitting Supreme Court 
Justice would dissent from the view that the commerce clause prohib-
its taxes that bear more heavily on the interstate than the intrastate 
enterprise merely because the former does business across state lines. 
Nor would there be any dispute that the "internal consistency" princi-
ple implements that view. The problem is that it arguably does more 
than that. As the dissenting opinions in Armco, Tyler Pipe, and 
Scheiner observed, 139 and as the discussion in Part II of this article 
demonstrates, general application of the "internal consistency" doc-
trine undermines the authority of a number of Supreme Court prece-
dents and places many existing state taxes in constitutional jeopardy. 
Perhaps this is as it should be, and the cases and taxes that have been 
threatened by the "internal consistency" doctrine do not deserve to 
survive in light of the policy that the "internal consistency" rule im-
137. See Regan, supra note 88, at 1186. 
138. Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington Dept. of Revenue, 107 S. Ct. 2810, 2827 (1987) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting). Beyond his disagreement with the Court over its application of the "internal 
consistency" principle in Tyler Pipe, see text at notes 34-43 & 52 supra, Justice Scalia launched a 
broad-based attack on the Court's negative commerce clause jurisprudence. According to Justice 
Scalia, the Court in adjudicating controversies under the negative commerce clause "has engaged 
in an enterprise that it has been unable to justify by textual support or even coherent nontextual 
theory, that it was almost certainly not intended to undertake, and that it has not undertaken 
very well." Tyler Pipe, 101 S. Ct. at 2829 (Scalia, J., dissenting). It is worth noting that Justice 
Scalia spoke only for himself in expressing these views. Even Chief Justice Rehnquist, no friend 
of the negative commerce clause, carefully distanced himself from the portion of Justice Scalia's 
dissent in Tyler Pipe that questioned the constitutional basis for the Court's negative commerce 
clause doctrine, although the Chief Justice joined Scalia in his attack on the Court's application 
of the negative commerce clause to the case under consideration. 107 S. Ct. at 2823. 
139.' See text at notes 28-29, 34-43 & 52-57 supra. 
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plements. On the other hand, in the face of assertions that general 
application of the "internal consistency" principle is "an entirely novel 
enterprise"140 that would "revolutionize the law of state taxation,"141 
it is worthwhile inquiring whether the Court could have faithfully ef-
fectuated its commerce clause policy by more familiar means. 
B. "Internal Consistency" and Multiple Taxation: 
Potential or Actual 
One of the principal complaints lodged against the "internal con-
sistency" doctrine is that it measures the validity of state taxes on the 
basis of hypothetical rather than actual burdens on interstate com-
merce. By assuming that other states have adopted the challenged 
levy imposed by the taxing state, the "internal consistency" test may 
condemn the tax even though no other state has imposed a similar 
levy. 142 As a consequence, taxes on interstate business may be struck 
down even though the business in fact pays no more tax than its intra-
state competitor.143 This was clearly the case in Armco, where the 
Ohio-based manufacturer selling in West Virginia pfrid no manufac-
turing tax to Ohio; it was also true, for the most part, in Tyler Pipe, 
where few of the Washington manufacturers selling in other states or 
out-of-state manufacturers selling in Washington could point to gross 
receipts taxes on wholesaling or manufacturing they had paid to other 
states.144 Justice Rehnquist could therefore assail the "internal consis-
tency" doctrine as rooted in "legal abstractions,"145 and he could com-
plain that "[ w ]here a State's taxes are linked exactly to the activities 
taxed, it should be unnecessary to examine a hypothetical taxing 
scheme to see if interstate commerce would be unduly burdened."146 
Justice Scalia could likewise object that the Court, by relying on the 
"internal consistency" principle, was failing to adhere "to our long 
140. American Trucking Assns v. Scheiner, 107 S. Ct. 2829, 2850 (1987) (O'Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
141. Tyler Pipe, 107 S. Ct. at 2825 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
142. See text at notes 25-26 & note 51 supra. 
143. Wholly apart from "internal consistency" concerns, the fact that the interstate business 
pays no more tax than its intrastate competitor does not necessarily mean that the interstate 
enterprise's claim is "abstract" or "hypothetical." If the interstate and intrastate business pay 
the same tax, but the intrastate business receives more governmental benefits for the tax, then it 
can be argued that the tax discriminates against interstate commerce in a very concrete way by 
imposing a higher effective tax rate on the interstate business. See Scheiner, 107 S. Ct. at 2841, 
2847; note 45 supra. 
144. See National Can Corp. v. Washington Dept. of Revenue, 109 Wash. 2d 878, 889, 749 
P.2d 1286, 1292, appeal dismissed and cen. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2030 (1988). 
145. Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 647 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64, 70 (1963)). 
146. 467 U.S. at 648. 
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tradition of judging State taxes on their own terms"147 and not "strik-
ing them down on the basis of assumptions as to what other States 
might do."148 
Insofar as the "internal consistency" doctrine is designed to pre-
vent multiple taxation of interstate business, however, the Court's 
"long tradition" is not precisely the one described by Justice Scalia. 149 
Indeed, as originally formulated, the multiple taxation doctrine was 
couched in the language of possibility rather than certainty. Constitu-
tionality depended on whether multiple burdens were capable of being 
imposed, not on whether they actually had been. In his seminal opin-
ion in Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue 150 articulating the 
multiple taxation doctrine, Justice Stone observed that 
[t]he vice characteristic of those [taxes] which have been held invalid is 
that they have placed on the commerce burdens of such a nature as to be 
capable, in point of substance, of being imposed with equal right by every 
state which the commerce touches, merely because interstate commerce 
is being done, so that without the protection of the commerce clause it 
would bear cumulative burdens not imposed on local commerce.151 
In J.D. Adams Manufacturing Co. v. Storen, 152 which followed on the 
heels of Western Live Stock, the Court declared: 
The vice of the statute as applied to receipts from interstate sales is that 
the tax includes in its measure, without apportionment, receipts derived 
from activities in interstate commerce; and that the exaction is of such a 
character that if lawful it may in substance be laid to the fullest extent by 
States in which the goods are sold as well as those in which they are 
manufactured. Interstate commerce would thus be subjected to the risk 
of a double tax burden to which intrastate commerce is not exposed, and 
which the cominerce clause forbids.1 53 
Other opinions rendered during the formative era of the multiple taxa-
tion doctrine likewise adhered to the precept that the risk of multiple 
taxation sufficed to invalidate the tax and that proof of actual multiple 
taxation was unnecessary.154 
147. Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington Dept. of Revenue, 107 S. Ct. 2810, 2826 (1987) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting). 
148. 107 S. Ct. at 2826 (emphasis in original). 
149. The following discussion draws freely from Hellerstein, Construing the Uniform Division 
of Income for Tax Purposes Act: Reflections on the Illinois Supreme Court's Reading of the 
"Throwback" Rule, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 768, 799-803 (1978) and Hellerstein, State Income Taxa-
tion, supra note 19, at 131-35. 
150. 303 U.S. 250 (1938). 
151. 303 U.S. at 255-56 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
152. 304 U.S. 307 (1938). 
153. 304 U.S. at 311 (emphasis added). 
154. See Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157, 166 (1954); Ott v. 
Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169, 174 (1949); Central Greyhound Lines v. Mealy, 
334 U.S. 653, 663 (1948); Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422, 429 (1947) 
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In subsequent opinions, the Court was not as consistent as it might 
have been in addressing the question whether the risk of multiple taxa-
tion provided the predicate for striking down a state tax on commerce 
clause grounds. On a few occasions, the Court seemed to require tax-
payers to demonstrate something more to support their claims. Thus 
in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 155 the Court 
noted that "[t]here is nothing to show that multiple taxation is pres-
ent. We cannot deal in abstractions. In this type of case the taxpayers 
must show that the formula places a burden upon interstate commerce 
in a constitutional sense."156 And in General Motors Corp. v. Wash-
ington, 151 the Court reiterated this position and noted that "[i]t has 
not been demonstrated what definite burden, in a constitutional sense, 
the St. Louis tax places on the identical shipments by which Washing-
ton measures its tax"158 or "that Oregon levies any tax on appellant's 
activity bearing on Washington sales."159 Yet in other decisions ren-
dered during the same period, the Court continued to espouse the view 
that the commerce clause forbade taxes that created a mere risk of 
multiple taxation.160 
The Court's 1978 opinion in Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. 
Bair 161 might have been read as signaling a shift in the Court's ap-
proach to the multiple taxation doctrine. In Moorman, the Court sus-
tained the constitutionality of Iowa's single-factor sales formula for 
apportioning corporate income. All of the taxpayer's products sold to 
Iowa customers were manufactured in Illinois. The taxpayer sought 
(overruled on other grounds by Department of Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedor-
ing Cos., 435 U.S. 734 (1978)); Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 439 
(1939); cf. International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 358 (1944) 
(Rutledge, J., concurring) ("either the actuality or the risk of [multiple taxation] makes the total 
burden cumulative, discriminatory or special"). Although Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 
U.S. 292 (1944) may be regarded as inconsistent with the "risk" rule, the Court subsequently 
read the case narrowly so as to conform to the "risk" rule. Braniff Airways v. Nebraska State 
Bd. of Equalization and Assessment, 347 U.S. 590, 601-02 (1954). 
155. 358 U.S. 450 (1959). 
156. 358 U.S. at 463. 
157. 377 U.S. 436 (1964) (overruled by Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dept. of Reve-
nue, 107 S. Ct. 2810 (1987)). See text at notes 58-67 supra (discussing the overruling of General 
Motors in Tyler Pipe). 
158. 377 U.S. at 449. 
159. 377 U.S. at 449. 
160. See Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Department of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560, 563 (1975) ("a 
vice in a tax on gross receipts of a corporation doing an interstate business is the risk of multiple 
taxation"); Evco v. Jones, 409 U.S. 91, 94 (1972) (levy subjected taxpayer to the "risk of a double 
tax burden"); Central R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607, 614 (1962) ("domiciliary State is 
precluded from imposing an ad valorem tax on any property to the extent that it could be taxed 
by another State, not merely on such property as is subjected to tax elsewhere") (emphasis in 
original). 
161. 437 U.S. 267 (1978). 
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to demonstrate that Iowa's single-factor formula.for apportioning net 
income, when considered in conjunction with Illinois' three-factor 
formula of property, payroll, and sales, subjected income derived from 
its Iowa sales to the risk of duplicative taxation in violation of the 
commerce clause. 
In rejecting this contention, the Court first declared that the tax-
payer had failed to establish "the essential factual predicate for a claim 
of duplicative taxation,"162 i.e., it had failed to prove the portion of its. 
income derived from Iowa sales that had in fact been taxed by both 
Iowa and Illinois. The Court went on to address the taxpayer's multi-
ple taxation claim on the assumption that there had been "some over-
lap" 163 in the taxation of the taxpayer's income. Because it was 
unwilling to hold that the commerce clause shielded taxpayers from 
multiple taxation resulting from the application of different formulas, 
it rejected that claim as well. 
Although Moorman can be read as endorsing the view that a tax-
payer must show actual multiple taxation to sustain its claim under 
the commerce clause, the case is more appropriately viewed as estab-
lishing the proposition that the commerce clause simply does not for-
bid every form of multiple taxation - whether potential or actual. To 
return to the point with which we commenced this article, when the 
risk or actuality of multiple taxation is a function of the application of 
two internally consistent formulas, it is constitutionally tolerable 
within broad limits.164 
This conclusion is supported by the three decisions succeeding 
Moorman prior to the Court's formal embrace of the "internal consis-
tency" principle. In its 1979 opinion in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of 
Los Angeles, 165 a case in which the state tax created multiple taxation 
in fact, the Court declared that "we have no occasion here to decide 
under what circumstances the mere risk of multiple taxation would 
invalidate a state tax."166 A year later, however, in Mobil Oil Corp. v. 
Commissioner of Taxes, 167 the Court squarely confronted that ques-
tion. In Mobil Vermont sought to tax an apportioned share of the 
taxpayer's dividend income from its unitary business being conducted 
162. 437 U.S. at 276. 
163. 437 U.S. at 277. 
164. See text at notes 12-17 supra; Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 
159, 184 (1983) (duplicative taxation of fourteen percent of taxpayer's income "within the sub-
stantial margin of error inherent in any method of attributing income among the components of a 
unitary business"). 
165. 441 U.S. 434 (1979). 
166. 441 U.S. at 452 n.17 (emphasis in original). 
167. 445 U.S. 425 (1980). 
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in part in Vermont. Mobil maintained that Vermont's claim to an 
apportioned share of its dividends threatened to expose more than 
100% of its income to state taxation because of the asserted power of 
New York, the state of Mobil's commercial domicile, to tax all of Mo-
bil's dividends on an unapportioned basis. Since New York did not in 
fact tax the dividends at issue, Mobil was subjected only to a risk of 
multiple taxation, and the Court therefore had to face the question 
whether proof of actual - not merely potential - multiple taxation 
was a prerequisite to establishing a violation of the commerce clause. 
In Mobil, the Court unequivocally put .its imprimatur upon the 
"risk" theory of the multiple taxation doctrine. It agreed with Mobil 
that "the constitutionality of a Vermont tax should not depend on the 
vagaries of New York tax policy."168 And it rejected the state court's 
contention that actual multiple taxation mtist be demonstrated to 
make out a case under the commerce clause. 169 A few months after its 
decision in Mobil, the Court reiterated its commitment to the "risk" 
theory of multiple taxation in Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Department of 
Revenue. 170 Exxon asserted that the power of Wisconsin to tax an 
apportioned share of its exploration and production income subjected 
that income to the risk of multiple taxation because of the alleged 
power of the states where the exploration and production occurred to 
tax all of such income. As in Mobil, the Court in Exxon entertained 
this claim despite its explicit recognition that "it is the risk of multiple 
taxation that is being asserted" 171 and that "actual multiple taxation 
has not been shown."112 
In sum, the Court's "long tradition" of considering allegations of 
multiple taxation does reflect a willingness to consider "abstract" or 
"hypothetical" claims in adjudicating the validity of state taxes. The 
question remains, however, whether Justices Rehnquist and Scalia are 
right as a matter of principle in objecting to the "internal consistency" 
doctrine because it dispenses with the requirement that a taxpayer in 
fact be burdened by the tax at issue. 
The Court's approach appears justified for several reasons. First, 
as the Court pointed out in Armco, "[a]ny other rule would mean that 
the ~onstitutionality of West Virginia's tax laws would depend on the 
168. 445 U.S. at 444. 
169. On the merits, the Court sustained Vermont's position that it was entitled to tax an 
apportioned share of Mobil's foreign source dividends derived from a unitary business being 
conducted in part in Vermont. See generally Hellerstein, State Income Taxation, supra note 19. 
170. 447 U.S. 207 (1980). 
171. 447 U.S. at 228 (emphasis in original). 
172. 447 U.S. at 228. 
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shifting complexities of the tax codes of 49 other States, and that the 
validity of the taxes imposed on each taxpayer would depend on the 
particular other States in which it operated."173 As a matter of princi-
ple, it is undesirable to fashion a rule of law that depends for its opera-
tion on the present configuration of the statutes of other states. 
Second, even if acceptable as a matter of principle, it is undesirable as 
a matter of practice. Taxpayers would face uncertainties in determin-
ing their state tax liabilities, states would face uncertainties in predict-
ing state tax collections, and compliance and administration 
difficulties would be exacerbated. Finally, even if otherwise accepta-
ble, there is something unseemly about determining state tax liabilities 
"on a first-come-first-tax basis."174 Given the fundamental concerns 
underlying the commerce clause, it would be perverse indeed to consti-
tutjonalize a rule rewarding beggar-thy-neighbor state tax policies 
with state tax collections depending on who won the race to the tax-
payer's door. 
C. ''Internal Consistency" and the Fair Apportionment Criterion 
All of the taxes invalidated or imperiled by the "internal consis-
tency" doctrine were unapportioned. Neither the business and occu-
pation (B & 0) taxes struck down in Armco and Tyler Pipe, nor the flat 
highway taxes struck down in Scheiner, nor the corporate qualifica-
tion, business license, and other tax~ considered in Part II of this arti-
cle, provided any mechanism for apportioning the tax measure to the 
state by reference to the taxed activities being conducted there. Yet 
the commerce clause has long required that a tax affecting interstate 
commerce be fairly apportioned to the taxpayer's activities in the tax-
ing state. 175 Why, one may reasonably ask, did not the commerce 
clause's fair apportionment criterion serve to dispose of the issues in 
Armco, Tyler Pipe, and Scheiner, thus obviating recourse to the con-
troversial "internal consistency" doctrine? The short answer is that it 
did - or at least that it should have. The longer answer, which is an 
extended one, may help explain why the Court ultimately invoked the 
"internal consistency" principle rather than the fair apportionment re-
173. Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644-45 (1984); see also Mobil, 445 U.S. at 444; 
text at note 168 supra; Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1975); Freeman v. 
Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 256 (1946). 
174. General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 458 (1964) (Goldberg, J., dissent-
ing) (overruled by Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington Dept. of Revenue, 107 S. Ct. 2810 (1987)). 
175. See Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry., 142 U.S. 217, 228 (1891); Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. 
Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18, 26 (1891); Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business: Perspec-
tives on Two Centuries of Constitutional Adjudication, 41 TAX LAW. 37, 57 (1987). 
October 1988] Commerce Clause Restraint on State Taxation 171 
quirement in striking down the levies in Armco, Tyler Pipe, and Ameri-
can Trucking Associations. 
1. The Fair Apportionment Criterion and Gross Receipts Taxes 
It will be most fruitful to begin our discussion of this question with 
Tyler Pipe, which squarely confronted the fair apportionment issue. 
Although the Court in Tyler Pipe held that Washington's B & 0 tax 
violated the "internal consistency" principle, 176 it nevertheless went 
on to consider alternative challenges to the levy because of the possi-
bility that the legislature could take remedial action that would cure 
the constitutional defect the Court had identified.177 The taxpayer had 
argued that Washington's B & 0 tax violated the commerce clause 
because it was not fairly apportioned to its activities in the taxing 
state. The Court's entire treatment of the issue is contained in the 
following paragraph: 
Washington taxes the full value of receipts from in-state wholesaling or 
manufacturing; thus, an out-of-state manufacturer selling in Washington 
is subject to an unapportioned wholesale tax even though the value of the 
wholesale transaction is partly attributable to manufacturing activity 
carried on in another State that plainly has jurisdiction to tax that activ-
ity. This apportionment argument rests on the erroneous assumption 
that through the B & 0 tax, Washington·is taxing the unitary activity of 
manufacturing and wholesaling. We have already determined, however, 
that the manufacturing tax and wholesaling tax are not compensating 
taxes for substantially equivalent events in invalidating the multiple ac-
tivities exemption. Thus, the activity of wholesaling - whether by an 
in-state or out-of-state manufacturer - must be viewed as a separate 
activity conducted wholly within Washington that no other State has 
jurisdiction to tax. 178 
The Court's disposition of the apportionment issue in Tyler Pipe 
cannot be squared with its professed commitment to a commerce 
clause jurisprudence based on the "practical effect"179 of state taxes 
and on "economic realities."180 As the Court acknowledges, Washing-
ton's B & 0 tax on wholesaling indisputably includes receipts attribu-
table in part to manufacturing activity earned on in other states. 
Moreover, as Justice Brennan suggested in his dissent from General 
Motors Corp. v. Washington, 181 which sustained Washington's B & 0 
176. See notes 30-33 supra and accompanying text. 
177. Tyler Pipe, 107 S. Ct. at 2821. For a discussion of the Court's suggested "solution" to 
the levy's "internal consistency" problem, see note 33 supra. 
178. 107 S. Ct. at 2822. 
179. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). 
180. 430 U.S. at 279. 
181. 377 U.S. 436 (1964). 
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tax on wholesaling over the objection that it violated the fair appor-
tionment criterion, 182 
if commercial activity in more than one State results in a sale in one of 
them, that State may not claim as all its own the gross receipts to which 
the activity within its borders has contributed only a part. Such a tax 
must be apportioned to reflect the business activity within the taxing 
State.183 
Indeed, it is startling to find the Court more tolerant of an unappor-
tioned levy measured by gross receipts that "affects each transaction in 
proportion to its magnitude and irrespective of whether it is profitable 
or otherwise"184 than it would be of such a levy measured by net in-
come that "does not arise at all unless a gain is shown over and above 
expenses and losses, and . . . cannot be heavy unless the profits are 
large." 185 
The Court's only response in Tyler Pipe to these arguments, other 
than to cite authority approving186 but not satisfactorily justifying187 
unapportioned gross receipts taxes, was the bald assertion that the ac-
tivity of wholesaling "must be viewed as a separate activity conducted 
wholly within Washington that no other State has jurisdiction to 
tax." 188 But this view of wholesaling as a "separate activity" that a 
state can tax without apportionment because the activity "must be 
viewed" as occurring "wholly within" the jurisdiction regardless of 
the measure of the tax is a retreat into the very formalism that the 
Court had purportedly abandoned in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. 
Brady 189 and its progeny. The Court, after all, has told us on numer-
ous occasions in recent years that these issues were to be decided on 
the basis of practical economic realities, not on the formal distinction 
between the subject and the measure of a tax. 190 Yet in Tyler Pipe, the 
Court directly relied on that formal distinction - invoking the fact 
182. Although the Court in Tyler Pipe overruled General Motors insofar as it sustained a levy 
that violated the "internal consistency" principle, see text at notes 58·67 supra, it did not dis· 
credit General Motors' disposition of the apportionment issue raised in the case. 
183. General Motors, 371 U.S. at 451 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
184. United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321, 329 (1918); cf. Central 
Greyhound Lines v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653, 663 (1948) ("tax may constitutionally be sustained on 
the [gross] receipts from the transportation apportioned as to the mileage within the State"). 
185. United States Glue Co., 247 U.S. at 329. , 
186. Tyler Pipe, 101 S. Ct. at 2822 (citing Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 280-81 
(1978) and Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Department of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560, 564 (1975)). 
187. See Hellerstein, Interstate Business, supra note 77, at 168-76 and text at notes 189-206 
infra. 
188. Tyler Pipe, 107 S. Ct. at 2822. 
189. 430 U.S. 274 (1977). 
190. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 614-17 (1981); Depart· 
ment of Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 743-48 (1978); 
Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 280-81. 
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that the subject of the tax is local wholesaling - to avoid an inquiry 
into the propriety of the measure of the tax, which concededly in-
cludes out-of-state values. 
The critical point is that a tax levied upon interstate activity -
whether measured by gross receipts, net income, or other values -
must reflect the portion of the enterprise's activity that is being con-
ducted in the taxing state, and the tax measure must be adjusted ac-
cordingly. Otherwise the state, under the guise of taxing some "local 
incident" of that interstate activity, would be able to sweep into its tax 
base gross receipts, net income, or other values that other states could 
include in their tax bases with equal justification by identifying some 
other "local incident" of that interstate activity. 191 The risk of multi-
ple taxation to which such a regime would expose interstate commerce 
is plain. 
The Court has generally recognized this problem in the context of 
taxes on interstate business activity measured by net income, property, 
and other values, and it.has therefore required apportionment of those 
values to reflect the taxpayer's activity in the taxing state, regardless of 
whether the formal subject of the tax was some local privilege or 
event. The question is why has it not done so in the context of taxes 
on interstate business activity measured by gross receipts? The an-
swer, as I have explained at greater length elsewhere, 192 seems to lie in 
two considerations. 
First, with respect to gross receipts taxes on interstate sales activ-
ity, the Court has analogized gross receipts taxes to retail sales and use 
taxes. 193 Because retail sales and use taxes are consumer taxes which 
are separately stated, collected from purchasers, and imposed on a 
transaction-by-transaction basis, apportionment of such levies - in 
the sense of division of the tax base - has never been viewed as a 
practicable solution to the multiple taxation issues that such taxes 
raise. 194 Instead, the Court in effect has had to decide whether the 
191. See generally Strecker; "Local Incidents" of Interstate Business, 18 OHIO ST. L.J. 69 
(1957). This is not to suggest that states may never impose unapportioned taxes on "local" 
subjects without burdening interstate commerce. They may do so if the tax base has no multi-
state attributes over which other states may properly assert their taxing authority. Hence there is 
no need to apportion an ad valorem tax on real property nor a gross receipts tax on a local 
massage parlor. But a tax measured by values generated by interstate activity is not immune 
from the requirement of fair apportionment merely because it is framed as a tax on a distinctly 
"local" event such as the privilege of engaging in local business. 
192. Hellerstein, Interstate Business, supra note 77, at 168-76. The ensuing discussion draws 
freely from this article. 
193. International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 348 (1944). 
194. Barrett, ''Substance" vs. "Form" in the Application of the Commerce Clause to State 
Taxation, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 740, 755, 776 (1953); Kust & Sale, State Taxation of Interstate 
Sales, 46 VA. L. REV. 1290, 1323-24 (1960). 
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state from which the goods were sent, the state to which the goods 
were shipped, or both, or neither would be permitted to tax retail in-
terstate sales.195 In fact, the Court has generally allowed the state of 
destination to tax retail sales transactions while forbidding the state of 
origin from doing so.196 By analogy, the Court has generally sustained 
gross receipts taxes on interstate sales activity when imposed by the 
state to which the goods were shipped 197 while prohibiting such taxes 
when imposed by the state from which the goods were sent.198 
Second, with respect to gross receipts taxes in general, the Court 
for many years espoused the view that the states could impose excise 
taxes on manufacturing, producing, and extracting activities measured 
by the unapportioned gross receipts from those activities. 199 The 
Court considered these activities to be "local" in nature, and it permit-
ted the states to measure the value of the activities by the gross re-
ceipts they generated notwithstanding their intimate connection with 
interstate activities. 
The Court's failure to insist on an analytically sound apportion-
ment solution in Tyler Pipe may thus be attributable to the existence of 
two large bodies of supporting precedent that it saw no compelling 
reason to disturb. Plausible explanations, however, must be distin-
guished from reasoned justifications. As suggested above,200 there is 
no theoretical justification for the Court's disposition of the apportion-
ment issue in Tyler Pipe. Moreover, even the precedents that appear 
at first glance to support the result in Tyler Pipe lose much of their 
force upon closer examination. The cases that eschew apportionment 
as an impractical (or unworkable) solution to the multiple taxation 
issues raised by retail sales taxes have little bearing on the question 
whether general business taxes imposed on interstate sales activity are 
apportionable. Unlike retail sales taxes, general business gross receipts 
taxes are neither separately stated nor imposed on a transaction-by-
195. See International Harvester, 322 U.S. at 358-62 (Rutledge, J., concurring and 
dissenting). 
196. See Hellerstein, Interstate Business, supra note 77, at 172. 
197. See Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Department of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560 (1975); Gen-
eral Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964) (overruled by Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Wash-
ington State Dept. of Revenue, 107 S. Ct. 2810 (1987)); Field Enterprises v. Washington, 352 
U.S. 806 (1956) (per curiam), ajfg., 47 Wash. 2d 852, 289 P.2d 1010 (1955); International Har-
vester, 322 U.S. at 340; Allied Mills, Inc. v. Department of Treasury, 318 U.S. 740 (1943) (per 
curiam), affg., 220 Ind. 340, 42 N.E.2d 34 (1942). 
198. See Evco v. Jones, 409 U.S. 91 (1972); Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 
U.S. 434 (1939); J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938). 
199. See, e.g., American Mfg. Co. v. City of St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919) (manufacturing); 
Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245 (1922) (extracting); Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 
274 U.S. 284 (1927) (producing). 
200. See text at notes 179-92 supra. 
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transaction basis. Hence, the analogy the Court may have drawn be-
tween retail sales taxes and general business gross receipts taxes on 
interstate sales activity is a false one insofar as the apportionment 
question is concerned. Furthermore, the Court indicated in its 1981 
opinion, Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 201 that its earlier 
precedents sustaining unapportioned gross receipts taxes on "local" 
activities may no longer be good law.202 The Court made it clear, at 
least as a matter of principle, that gross receipts taxes affecting inter-
state commerce were subject to the same " 'consistent and rational 
method of inquiry' "203 it had applied to other taxes which focused on 
" 'the practical effect of a challenged tax.' "204 This " 'practical' anal-
ysis"205 requires, among other things, that a tax affecting interstate 
commerce be "fairly apportioned.''206 
2. Applying the Fair Apportionment Criterion to the Court's 
''Internal Consistency" Cases 
If the Court in Tyler Pipe had approached the apportionment issue 
along the lines suggested by Justice Brennan's dissent in General Mo-
tors, 207 it would not only have met the objections set forth in the fore-
going discussion, but it would also have resolved the multiple taxation 
problem raised by Tyler Pipe without recourse to the "internal consis-
tency" doctrine. An example demonstrates this is so. . 
Assume that there are three taxpayers, A, B, and C, each of which 
201. 453 U.S. 609 (1981). 
202. In Commonwealth Edison, which involved a commerce clause challenge to Montana's 
severance tax, the Court explicitly disapproved the rationale of Heisler and its progeny (including 
Hope Natural Gas) that taxes on "local" activities were not subject to commerce clause scrutiny. 
453 U.S. at 614-17. On the other hand, the Court approved the statement of the Montana 
Supreme Court that there was no question in the case involving multiple taxation because " 'the 
severance can occur in no other state' and 'no other state can tax the severance.' " 453 U.S. at 
617. 
203. 453 U.S. at 615 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 443 
(1980)). 
204. 453 U.S. at 615. 
205. 453 U.S. at 616. 
206. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977) (quoted in Common-
wealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 617). See also Shores, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce - Quiet 
Revolution or Much Ado About Nothing?, 38 TAX L. R.Ev. 127, 150 (1982) (arguing for applica-
tion of apportionment principles to gross receipts taxes); Miers, The "Urban Severance Tax'~· 
Some Questions as to Apportionment, 18 TULSA L.J. 359, 390 (1983) (suggesting apportionment 
of severance taxes); cf. National Liberty Life Ins. Co. v. State, 62 Wis. 2d 347, 215 N.W.2d 26 
(1974), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 421 U.S. 940, 946 (1975) (tax on gross premiums of 
insurance company struck down under due process clause because it was unapportioned); Indi-
ana Dept. of Revenue v. P.F. Goodrich Corp., 260 Ind. 41, 292 N.E.2d 247 (1973) (gross income 
tax could not' be applied to proceeds of a liquidation dividend received from an out-of-state cor-
poration unless it was fairly apportioned). 
207. See text at note 183 supra. 
176 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:138 
has $100 of gross receipts from the wholesale sale of products it manu-
factures. Taxpayer A is an interstate business that manufactures prod-
ucts in Washington that it sells in other states, and its Washington 
apportionment percentage, based on its average percentage of Wash-
ington property, payroll, and sales, is 67%.208 Taxpayer B is an inter-
state business that manufactures products in other states that it sells in 
Washington, and its Washington apportionment percentage, based on 
the same factors, is 33%. Taxpayer C is an intrastate business that 
manufactures products in Washington that it sells in Washington, and 
it has no right to apportion its income because its activities are wholly 
intrastate. 209 
If Washington's gross receipts tax had been applied on an appor-
tioned basis to Taxpayers A, B, and C: there would have been no dis-
crimination against interstate commerce and no possibility of multiple 
taxation (beyond that which the Court has found tolerable under the 
commerce clause).210 Taxpayer A would have paid a manufacturing 
tax on 67% of its gross receipts, the proportion that fairly reflected its 
business activities in the state. Taxpayer B would have paid a whole-
saling tax on 33% of its gross receipts, the proportion that fairly re-
flected its business activities in the state. Taxpayer C would have paid 
a wholesaling tax on 100% of its gross receipts, the proportion that 
fairly reflected its business activities in the state. The multiple activi-
ties exemption would be unobjectionable because it would simply re-
lieve C: the local manufacturer/wholesaler, from paying a tax on 
200% of its gross receipts from its commercial activity in the state. 
Moreover, insofar as Taxpayers A or B engaged in both manufacturing 
and wholesaling activity in the state, they too would benefit from the 
multiple activities exemption which would assure that no more than 
100% of the receipts from the activities fairly apportioned to the state 
are taxed by the state. 
In taxing only an apportioned share of the gross receipts from in-
terstate manufacturing-wholesaling activity, Washington would thus 
avoid creating an unconstitutional risk of multiple taxation. Other 
states would likewise be free to tax a fairly apportioned share of the 
gross receipts from interstate manufacturing-wholesaling activity at-
tributable to activities in such states. These levies would be justified 
under long-standing commerce clause doctrine sustaining apportioned 
208. See note 19 supra. 
209. A taxpayer engaged in business in only one state has no right to apportion his tax base. 
See J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEJN, supra note 13, at 422. 
210. See text at notes 14-17 supra. 
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taxes on interstate commercial activities without reference to their "in-
ternal consistency." 
Furthermore, even if the "internal consistency" requirement was 
applied to apportioned gross receipts taxes, it would be satisfied by the 
formulas typically employed for apportioning net income.211 Nor 
would the multiple activities exemption in Washington's (and in West 
Virginia's) B & 0 tax raise any question of "internal consistency." 
The apportionment of the tax measure - gross receipts - would in-
sure that only a fair share of the tax base was being attributed to the 
state, and the multiple activities exemption would serve the salutary 
function of assuring that the same tax measure was not taxed twice to 
the same taxpayer merely because the legislature had included it in the 
tax base under two taxable subjects - manufacturing · and 
wholesaling. 212 
Just as apportionment would provide a solution to the multiple tax 
problem raised by Armco and Tyler Pipe without recourse to the "in-
ternal consistency" doctrine, so apportionment would provide a solu-
tion to the multiple tax problem raised by Scheiner without recourse to 
the "internal consistency" doctrine. If the axle and marker fees had 
been apportioned to the truck's activity in the state on the basis of in-
state miles to total miles or some other factor, the levies would have 
created no commerce clause problem. Interstate trucks would have 
paid only that portion of the fee that corresponded to the proportion 
of their activity in Pennsylvania, and interstate commerce would have 
suffered no discrimination or multiple tax burden. Moreover, as in the 
case of apportioned gross receipts taxes, apportioned flat truck taxes 
would satisfy the "internal consistency" requirement. If every state 
imposed Pennsylvania's flat highway taxes, but apportioned them to 
the mileage that the truck operated in the state, the interstate truck 
would pay no more than the intrastate truck, although it would make 
its payment to several jurisdictions. 
In short, the commerce clause concerns of discrimination and mul-
tiple tax burdens that the Court addressed with the aid of the "internal 
consistency" principle in Armco, Tyler Pipe, and Scheiner could as eas-
ily have been dealt with by a rigorous application of traditional appor-
tionment principles without mention of the phrase "internal 
consistency." The Court's unwillingness to take seriously its·own re-
211. See Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169-71 (1983); text 
at notes 9-19 supra. 
212. See Judson & Duffy, An Opportunity Missed: Annco, Inc. v. Hardesty, A Retreat from 
Economic Reality in Analysis of State Taxes, 87 W. VA. L. REV. 723, 744-46 (1985) (criticizing 
the Court's analysis of gross receipts taxes in Armco as "artificial" and arguing that the Court 
should have required apportionment of the tax base). 
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quirement that taxes be fairly apportioned may have created an envi-
ronment in which some proxy for the fair apportionment criterion -
like "internal consistency" - would be invoked for the same purpose. 
If a proper application of the fair apportionment requirement 
would have invalidated the levies at issue in Armco, Tyler Pipe, and 
Scheiner, it raises the question whether the Court's adoption of the 
"internal consistency" principle makes any difference, except a seman-
tic one. Insofar as the Court has refused in the past to insist on true 
apportionment in cases like Armco, Tyler Pipe, and Scheiner, the appli-
cation of the "internal consistency" rule does indeed make a signifi-
cant difference in the outcomes of such cases and of others considered 
in Part II. From a theoretical standpoint, however, it would appear 
that an uncompromising application of the fair apportionment re-
quirement to cases involving allegations of multiple taxation would in 
most instances produce results essentially indistinguishable from the 
application of the "internal consistency" principle. This conclusion 
should not be surprising considering that the fair apportionment re-
quirement and the "internal consistency" requirement are both 
designed, at least in part,213 to prohibit the same evil- multiple taxa-
tion of the interstate business. Perhaps, then, the "internal consis-
tency" doctrine is not so "novel"214 or "revolutionary"215 after all, but 
is merely another name for the fair apportionment requirement the 
Court should have been insisting on all along. 
There is, however, at least one multiple tax problem that escapes 
solution under the "internal consistency" principle but is addressed by 
a strict application of the fair apportionment requirement. As Justice 
Scalia observed in his dissenting opinion in Tyler Pipe, although the 
"internal consistency" principle condemns taxes if the adoption of the 
same tax by other states would impose a multiple tax burden on the 
multistate business, it does not deal with the problem of multiple taxa-
tion created by states imposing different taxes on the interstate enter-
prise. 216 Thus, as the "simplest example" of a valid, but cumulatively 
burdensome levy, he points out that 
[a] tax on manufacturing (without a tax on wholesaling) will have a dis-
criminatory effect upon interstate commerce if another State adopts a tax 
on wholesaling (without a tax on manufacturing) - for then a company 
manufacturing and selling in the former State would pay only a single 
tax, while a company manufacturing in the former [S]tate but selling in 
213. The concerns of the fair apportionment requirement are not limited to multiple taxa-
tion. See text at notes 245-63 infra. 
214. See text at note 140 supra. 
215. See text at note 141 supra. 
216. Tyler Pipe, 107 S. Ct. at 2826 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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the latter State would pay two taxes.2 17 
Justice Scalia regarded this as further evidence of the ill-considered 
nature of the "internal consistency" doctrine because he saw "no rea-
son why the fact that other States, by adopting a similar tax, might 
cause Washington's tax to have a discriminatory effect on interstate 
commerce, is of any more significance than the fact that other States, 
by adopting a dissimilar tax, might produce such a result."218 
Because Justice Scalia shared the Court's view that apportionment 
was an inappropriate solution to the problem raised by Washington's 
B & 0 tax,219 he did not consider the possibility that apportionment of 
Washington's tax would solve the multiple tax problem he identified. 
As suggested above, 220 a requirement that gross receipts taxes be ap-
portioned would have assured that an interstate manufacturer/whole-
saler's receipts would be divided between the manufacturing and 
selling jurisdictions based on its activities in the state. The fact that 
one state taxed the receipts under a manufacturing tax while the other 
taxed them under a wholesaling tax would have no effect on the enter-
prise's tax liability. Thus, the problem identified by Justice Scalia 
would disappear. 221 
217. 107 S. Ct. at 2826. 
218. 107 S. Ct. at 2826 (emphasis in original). United Engrs. & Constructors v. Rose, 363 
S.E.2d 477 (W. Va. 1987) illustrates Justice Scalia's point. The taxpayer performed engineering 
and design services outside of West Virginia in connection with a construction contract per-
formed within West Virginia. The Court held, as a matter of state law, that all of the receipts 
from the construction contract, which included payment for the engineering and design services, 
were taxable under West Virginia's B & 0 tax as receipts from "contracting" performed in the 
state. The court then turned to the taxpayer's claim that the West Virginia tax violated the 
"internal consistency" requirement because the same engineering and design services taxed by 
West Virginia would allegedly be taxed by the state where the services were performed, assum-
ing, as "internal consistency" analysis requires, that the other state taxed "contracting" services. 
On this assumption, the interstate contractor would be taxed twice on its engineering and design 
services whereas its intrastate competitor would be taxed just once. The court rejected this argu-
ment on the ground West Virginia taxes design and engineering services only where the construc-
tion is being conducted, and that if every state adhered to such a scheme there would be no 
multiple taxation in violation of the "internal consistency" requirement. 363 S.E.2d at 482-83. 
If, however, another state imposed a "professional services" tax measured by receipts from all 
professional services performed in the state regardless of where the services were ultimately used, 
while West Virginia imposed a "contracting" tax measured by receipts from all contracts for 
local construction regardless of where the services underlying the contract were performed, the 
interstate enterprise would suffer a multiple tax burden on its receipts from engineering and 
design services, even though its "internal consistency" claim would fall on deaf ears. Apportion-
ment of the receipts from engineering and design services performed as a part of interstate com-
mercial activity, on the other hand, would protect the interstate enterprise from a multiple tax 
burden not borne by its local competitor. See text at notes 207-12 supra. 
219. Tyler Pipe, 107 S. Ct. at 2824-25; see text at note 40 supra. 
220. See text at notes 207-12 supra. 
221. Wholly apart from the possibility of apportionment as a solution to the problem Justice 
Scalia has identified, one may question whether he has in fact identified a problem of discrimina-
tion under the commerce clause. It is true, as Justice Scalia points out, that if different states 
employ different taxing schemes, some interstate firms will pay more tax than their intrastate 
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* * * * * * 
The foregoing discussion of the multiple activities exemption issues 
raised by Armco and Tyler Pipe has proceeded on the assumption that, 
with respect to manufacturing and wholesaling conducted by a single 
taxpayer, the West Virginia and Washington B & 0 taxes were in sub-
stance a single levy applied to a single tax base;222 that the multiple 
activities exemption was designed to avoid taxing the same taxpayer 
twice for engaging in closely related business activity; that the tax was 
in no sense a value added tax imposed on separately identified gross 
receipts representing manufacturing value, on the one hand, and 
wholesaling value, on the other; and that essentially the same gross 
receipts were included in the tax measure whether the levy was de-
nominated a "manufacturing" tax or a "wholesaling" tax. This view 
of the B & 0 taxes generally reflects their actual operation.223 
This view is not, however, the only one that may be taken of the 
matter. If one adopts a more formalistic approach to the levies, as did 
the Court in Armco and Tyler Pipe, and considers the tax on manufac-
competitors. However, interstate firms are not disadvantaged as such. Under Justice Scalia's 
hypothetical, an interstate firm that manufactured in the state that taxes wholesaling and whole-
saled in the state that taxes manufacturing would pay no taxes at all, and would thus enjoy an 
advantage over its intrastate competitors in either state. Hence any disadvantage to the particu-
lar interstate firm from the two different taxing schemes would be adventitious. As noted above, 
the Court has found such adventitious burdens resulting from states' different taxing schemes 
constitutionally tolerable. See text at notes 14-17 and 161-64supra. These adventitious burdens 
should be distinguished from the predictable burdens imposed on the interstate enterprise as such 
as a result of the multiple activities exemptions at issue in Armco and Tyler Pipe. See text at 
notes 222-31 infra. 
222. Nothing in this or the preceding discussion should be read as suggesting that the state 
must impose a single tax on manufacturing and wholesaling activity conducted by a single tax-
payer. The discussion simply assumes that this is the way West Virginia and Washington were in 
fact taxing manufacturer/wholesalers. As noted below, other assumptions are plausible, and 
they require that the issues be analyzed within an analytical framework different from that con-
structed above. 
223. Thus the measure of West Virginia's (subsequently repealed) tax on manufacturing was 
"the value of the entire product manufactured," W. VA. CODE§ l l-13-2b (Supp. 1983) (repealed 
1985), which was generally determined by "the gross proceeds of sales." W. Va. Business and 
Occupation Tax Regulation§ 2.02(a), [Pre-July 1, 1987 Transfer Binder] [W. Va.] St. Tax Rep. 
(CCH) ~ 68-810 (Dec. 29, 1982); the measure of West Virginia's tax on wholesaling was "the 
gross income of the business," W. VA. CODE§ 1 l-13-2c (1974) (repealed 1985), which meant the 
"gross receipts of the taxpayer derived from ... sales and the value proceeding or accruing from 
the sale of tangible property ... " W. VA. CODE§ 11-13-1 (1987). The measure of Washington's 
tax on manufacturing was "the value of the products," WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 82.04.240 
(Supp. 1988), which was generally determined by the "gross proceeds of sales." WASH. ADMIN. 
CODE 458-20-112 (1983); the measure of Washington's tax on wholesaling was the "gross pro-
ceeds of sales." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 82.04.270 (Supp. 1988). In short, the measure of 
both the manufacturing and wholesaling taxes in West Virginia and Washington was generally 
gross proceeds or receipts from sales, although the measure of the manufacturing tax on out-of-
state sales could be reduced to reflect out-of-state transportation costs. W. Va. Business and 
Occupation Tax Regulation§ 2.03(b), [Pre-July l, 1987 Transfer Binder] [W. Va.] St. Tax Rep. 
(CCH) ~ 68-810 (Dec. 29, 1982); WASH. ADMIN. CODE§ 458-20-112 (1983). All this may sim-
ply attest to the fact that manufacturers typically generate gross receipts by selling at wholesale. 
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turing and the tax on wholesaling as two separate exactions on discrete 
activities, even when carried on by the same taxpayer,224 then the pre-
ceding analysis of the multiple. activities exemption problem, with its 
emphasis on apportionment as the proposed solution, is not wholly 
satisfactory. If the manufacturing and wholesaling taxes are perceived 
as two independent levies, a multiple activities exemption could dis-
criminate against interstate commerce despite the fact that both taxes 
are fairly apportioned. Because the exemption from a fairly appor-
tioned gross receipts tax on manufacturing would be available to the 
taxpayer only insofar as it had fairly apportioned receipts from whole-
saling, and because exemption from a fairly apportioned gross receipts 
tax on wholesaling would be available to the taxpayer only insofar as it 
had fairly apportioned receipts from manufacturing, the multiple ac-
tivities exemption would create an incentive for the taxpayer to con-
duct its manufacturing activities where it conducted its wholesaling 
activities. 225 
The vice of such a scheme was recognized by the Supreme Court in 
Maryland v. Louisiana, 226 where it struck down a tax on Outer Conti-
nental Shelf (OCS) gas used in Louisiana because, among other things, 
the tax could be credited against Louisiana severance tax liability: 
"The obvious economic effect of this Severance Tax Credit is to en-
courage natural gas owners involved in the production of OCS gas to 
invest in mineral exploration and development within Louisiana rather 
than to invest in further OCS development or in production iri other 
States."227 The levy therefore violated the commerce clause principle 
forbidding state taxing measures that "foreclos[e] tax-neutral deci-
224. When manufacturing and wholesaling activities are conducted by different tiptpayers, 
the B & 0 levies clearly tax the two activities separately. It is only when manufacturing and 
wholesaling activities are conducted by a single taxpayer that one can argue that the B & 0 tax 
effectively subjects the activities to a single levy. The multiple activities exemption therefore 
discriminates in favor of vertically integrated enterprises, which will pay only one tax on manu-
facturing or wholesaling, and against independent manufacturers and wholesalers which will 
collectively pay two such taxes. But such discrimination does not implicate commerce clause 
concerns. See Exxon v. Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (sustaining, over commerce clause objec-
tions, regulation discriminating against vertically integrated oil companies). 
225. For example, assume that every state imposed a fairly apportioned gross receipts tax on 
both manufacturing and wholesaling activity conducted within the state, with an exemption from 
the manufacturing tax insofar as the gross receipts were taxable under the wholesaling tax. Only 
those taxpayers who conducted all their manufacturing and wholesaling activities in a single 
state, or who conducted their manufacturing activities in precise proportion to their wholesaling 
activities in particular states, would enjoy the full benefit of the exemption. Taxpayers whose 
wholesaling activities did not precisely correspond on a geographical basis to their manufacturing 
activities would lose the benefit of the exemption insofar as taxable receipts from wholesaling 
were unavailable to reduce the gross receipts taxable under the manufacturing tax. 
226. 451 U.S. 725 (1981). 
227. 451 U.S. at 757. 
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sions"228 by "providfug a direct commercial advantage to local busi-
ness"229 and thereby inducing taxpayers to conduct in-state 
activities. 230 
More fundamentally, the problem with the multiple activities ex-
emption, viewed in the context of two separate exactions imposed on 
two independent taxable activities, is that it provides relief from the 
tax on o~e activity based on the carrying on in the state of the other. 
Such a scheme creates an incentive for taxpayers to consolidate their 
activities in a single state so as to minimize their aggregate tax burden, 
at least if one assumes, along with "internal consistency" analysis, that 
every state has adopted a similar taxing regime. However, apportion-
ment does not completely solve this problem. Apportionment ad-
dresses the problem of overtaxation that arises when a state seeks to 
tax more than its appropriate share of a tax base to which other states 
may lay a legitimate claim. It does not address the problem of 
undertaxation that arises when a state relinquishes its claim to its 
usual share of a tax base because the taxpayer engages in additional 
local activity. 
Apportionment therefore may be regarded as less than a panacea 
to the multiple activities exemption problem if one views the manufac-
turing and wholesaling taxes imposed on taxpayers engaged in both 
activities as two distinct levies. Such a conclusion, however, does not 
ipso facto justify the Court's invocation of the "internal consistency" 
principle to invalidate the exemptions. When the effect of a state levy 
is to "undertax" local activity vis-a-vis interstate commerce, the 
Court's commerce clause precedents provide ample authority to inval-
idate such taxes without recourse to the "internal consistency" 
principle. 231 
3. ''Internal Consistency," Fair Apportionment, and Tax Credits 
A final piece in the "internal consistency" mosaic that warrants 
brief attention is the impact of tax credits on the constitutional analy-
sis. A tax that appears to be internally inconsistent will nevertheless 
228. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comrnn., 429 U.S. 318, 331 (1977). 
229. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959). 
230. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388 (1984) (invalidating tax credit 
that induced taxpayers to conduct export-related activity within state); Halliburton Oil Well 
Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64 (1963) (invalidating sales-use tax scheme that induced tax· 
payers to assemble equipment within state). 
231. See, e.g., Westinghouse, 466 U.S. at 400 ("undertaxation" of those engaged in local ex-
port-related activity where larger tax credit was provided for shipping activities conducted in 
New York); Boston Stock Exchange, 429 U.S. at 331 ("undertaxation" of those selling stock in 
New York state). 
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pass the "internal consistency" test if the taxing state grants a credit 
for taxes paid to other states on the same tax base. For example, a flat 
highway tax, though internally inconsistent on its face, will pass the 
"internal consistency" test if the taxing state grants a credit for flat 
highway taxes imposed by other states. If such a taxing scheme were 
in force in every state, the interstate trucker, like his intrastate com-
petitor, would pay a tax to only one state, and he would receive a 
credit against that tax in other states in which he operated. 232 The 
crediting device thus shields the interstate business from the risk of 
multiple taxation that the "internal consistency" doctrine was 
designed to prevent. 233 
The Supreme Court explicitly recognized this point in Tyler Pipe. 
It observed that Washington could eliminate the interstate enterprise's 
exposure to multiple taxation of receipts generated by wholesaling and 
manufacturing by granting local manufacturers a credit against Wash-
ington manufacturing tax liability for wholesale taxes paid to other 
states and by granting out-of-state manufacturers a credit against 
Washington wholesaling tax liability for manufacturing taxes paid to 
other states. 234 A similar point can be made with regard to the credit 
that most states provide against their use taxes for sales or use taxes 
paid to other states.235 Citing Tyler Pipe, the Supreme Court of Illi-
nois in Goldberg v. Johnson 236 likewise declared that the provision of a 
credit against the state's telecommunications excise tax "cures any 
possible constitutional infirmity resulting from multiple taxation."237 
If a credit against state tax liability for taxes paid to other states on 
the same tax base generally eliminates the risk of multiple taxation, 
and with it the claim of internal inconsistency, the question remains 
232. This assumes that every state has imposed a fiat tax of the same magnitude and that the 
states have employed consistent rules for allowing credits against other states' taxes. Although 
this assumption is appropriate for purposes of "internal consistency" analysis, which contem-
plates the replication of the challenged state's tax by other states, as a practical matter states' fiat 
highway taxes will vary in amount and differing crediting schemes can produce multiple taxation 
of the interstate business. See note 118 supra. 
233. Although true as a matter of principle, inconsistent crediting schemes can in practice 
result in multiple taxation. See note 118 supra. 
234. Tyler Pipe, 107 S. Ct. at 2819-21; see note 33 supra. The Court made an analogous point 
in Scheiner with regard to registration fees. Because every state recognizes the registration of 
every other state, the payment of a registration fee to one state - even though fiat and unappor-
tioned - does not impose a multiple tax burden on the interstate truck: "Having paid one regis-
tration fee, a vehicle may pass among the States as freely as it may roam the State in which it is 
based .•.. " 107 S. Ct. at 2840. In substance, the registration reciprocity provisions operate like 
credits. 
235. See text at notes 117-20 supra. 
236. 117 ID. 2d 493, 512 N.E.2d 1262 (1987) (per curiam), prob. juris. noted sub nom. 
Goldberg v. Sweet, 108 S. Ct. 1010 (1988). The case is considered further at notes 251-63 infra. 
237. Goldberg. 512 N.E.2d at 1267. 
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whether a credit similarly disposes of objections to a levy on fair ap-
portionment grounds. The Vermont Supreme Court gave an affirma-
tive answer to this question in sustaining a use tax measured by the 
full, unapportioned purchase price of a corporate aircraft, even though 
only 17% of the aircraft's flight time was attributable to Vermont.238 
In response to the taxpayer's claim that the use tax had to be appor-
tioned to the aircraft's activities in Vermont, the court declared: 
Two methods of taxation have been developed to ameliorate the risk of 
cumulative tax burdens upon interstate transactions. First, ... multiple 
taxation may be avoided by a tax credit which provides an offset or ex-
emption if a sales or use tax has been paid to another state or jurisdic-
tion. Second, the tax burden may be apportioned .... 
The Commerce Clause does not require apportionment in addition to 
a tax credit. The rule of Complete Auto [Transit, Inc. v. Brady239] re-
quiring a tax on interstate commerce to be "fairly apportioned" is satis-
fied here. The state has provided a tax credit in lieu of apportionment. 
This credit, not unlike a proportionate tax, eliminates the possibility of 
cumulative use tax liability. 240 
Opinions from other state tribunals share the Vermont court's view 
that the availability of a credit against other states' taxes obviates the 
need for apportionment. 241 Moreover, the Supreme Court has re-
cently remarked in passing that a credit satisfies the fair apportion-
ment requirement: "The Louisiana taxing scheme is fairly 
apportioned, for it provides a credit against its use tax for sales taxes 
that have been paid in other States. "242 
The problem with the position advanced by the Vermont court is 
not that it reached the wrong result in the case before it. As noted 
above, 243 apportionment of the tax base has never been regarded as a, 
practicable solution to the multiple taxation issues raised by retail 
sales and use taxes like the levy at issue in the Vermont and kindred 
238. Frank W. Whitcomb Constr. Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 144 Vt. 466, 479 A.2d 
164 (1984). 
239. 430 U.S. 274 (1977). 
240. Whitcomb Constroction, 144 Vt. at 471, 473, 479 A.2d at 167-68. 
241. Director of Revenue v. Superior Aircraft Leasing Co., 734 S.W.2d 504, 507 (Mo. 1987); 
K.SS Transp. Corp. v. Baldwin, 9 N.J. Tax 273, 287 (1987); H.K. Porter Co. v. Commonwealth, 
534 A.2d 169, 171 (Pa. Commw. Ct.1987). 
242. D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 108 S. Ct. 1619, 1623 (1988). In Holmes, the Court 
upheld, over commerce clause objections, the application of Louisiana's use tax to a retailer's 
customers in the state. The Court's comment regarding apportionment, in general, and the rela· 
tionship between apportionment and credits, in particular, was dictum because the taxpayer 
raised no issue of unfair apportionment in the case. See Brief for Appellant, D. H. Holmes Co. v. 
McNamara, 108 S. Ct. 1619 (1988) (No. 87-267). 
243. See text at notes 194-99 supra. 
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cases. 244 In such cases, a crediting scheme may be the only feasible 
method of avoiding multiple taxation. Insistence on true apportion-
ment, in the sense of division of the tax base among the states that 
have a substantial connection with the interstate activity that gener-
ates the tax base, could create administrative chaos in the enforcement 
of retail sales and use taxes. 
The problem with the position advanced by the Vermont court is 
rather that it equates the fair apportionment requirement with the pro-
scription against multiple taxation when in fact the fair apportionment 
requirement is not so confined. To be sure, the fair apportionment 
requirement precludes multiple taxation within certain limits,245 and 
tax credits achieve the same objective. But our acceptance of tax cred-
its as a practical solution to the multiple tax problems raised by sales 
and use taxes should not blind us to the fact that an unapportioned tax 
remains an unapportioned tax regardless of whether it is offset by a 
credit. 
Retail sales and use taxes are generally unapportioned.246 There is 
no more justification in principle for a state taxing the unapportioned 
gross receipts from an interstate retail sale - i.e., a sale of goods 
shipped from a seller in one state to a purchaser in another - than 
there is for a state taxing the unapportioned gross receipts from other 
interstate business activity.247 In both cases "commercial activity in 
more than one State results in a sale in one ofthem,"248 and there is no 
reason why the state of origin 'or the state of destination may "claim as 
all its own the gross receipts to which the activity within its borders 
has contributed only a part."249 In relying on credits as a remedy to 
244. All the cases cited in note 241 supra involved retail use taxes on corporate aircraft. See 
also Service Merchandise Co. v. Jackson, 735 S.W.2d 443, 445 (Tenn. 1987); Great Arn. Airways 
v. Nevada State Tax Commissioner, 101 Nev. 422, 426-28, 705 P.2d 654, 657-58 (1985) (per 
curiam), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 74 (1986) and Miller v. Commissioner of Revenue, 359 N.W.2d 
620, 622 (Minn.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1116 (1985), where the courts indicated that retail use 
taxes need not be apportioned. 
245. See text at notes 12-17 supra. 
246. Some states apportion retail sales and use taxes imposed on purchases of vehicles and 
parts by interstate transportation companies. See FLA. STAT. §§ 212.08(8)-.08(9) (1987); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 297A.212 (West Supp. 1988). 
247. See text at notes 175-206 supra for the argument that states should be required to appor-
tion gross receipts on interstate business activity. 
248. General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 451 (1964) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
249. General Motors, 377 U.S. at 451; see also International Harvester Co. v. Department of 
Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 358-62 (1944) (Rutledge, J., concurring) (undue burden of cumulative 
taxation exists in the absence of a credit or apportionment). It is true that Justice Brennan, 
before penning the words quoted in the text, did declare that "[o]f course, when a sale may be 
localized completely in one State, there is no danger of multiple taxation, and, as in the case of a 
retail sales tax, the State may use as its tax base the total gross receipts arising within its bor-
ders." General Motors, 377 U.S. at 450. Moreover, this view that there are wholly "local" events 
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the multiple taxation problem raised by unapportioned sales and use 
taxes, it should be noted that the grant of a credit does not make the 
tax fairly apportioned and that credits are no more than a second-best 
alternative, compelled by administrative considerations, to the fair ap-
portionmnent of a tax base. 
The reason why it is important not to confuse a credit with the 
apportionment of a tax base is that the fair apportionment requirement 
is directed at broader concerns. Wholly apart from its role in prevent-
ing multiple taxation, the fair apportionment criterion serves to limit 
the territorial reach of state power by requiring that the state's tax 
base corresponds to the taxpayer's in-state presence.250 A credit 
designed to avoid the risk of multiple taxation may not satisfy the fair 
apportionment requirement - at least in cases in which apportion-
ment is administratively practicable. 
This distinction is well illustrated by Goldberg v. Johnson, to which 
this article alluded briefly above251 and in which the Supreme Court 
has noted probable jurisdiction. 252 Goldberg involved a commerce 
clause challenge to Illinois' telecommunications excise tax, which is 
imposed on the "act or privilege of originating or receiving interstate 
telecommunications" in the state at the rate of five percent of the 
unapportioned gross charge for such telecommunications.253 
Although the levy appeared on its face to flunk the "internal consis-
tency" test, 254 the Illinois Supreme Court, as noted above, held that 
that may be taxed without apportionment is one to which the Court still adheres, at least in part. 
Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington Dept. of Revenue, 107 S. Ct. 2810, 2822 (1987); Common· 
wealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 616 (1981). See also text at note 178 and note 202 
supra. As a matter of logic, however, the statement quoted in the text is as pertinent to a tax on 
an interstate retail sale as to a tax on business activity measured by receipts from interstate 
wholesale sales. Unless we are to be mesmerized by the labels to which the states attach to 
exactions measured by receipts from interstate activities - and we have it on high authority that 
we should not, see, e.g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), there is no 
reason in theory why the two levies considered by Justice Brennan should be treated differently 
for purposes of the fair apportionment criterion. 
250. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Missouri State Tax Commn., 390 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1968). This 
aspect of the fair apportionment requirement is rooted in both the commerce and due process 
clauses. 390 U.S. at 325 & n.5. See also note 11 supra. 
251. See text at note 236 supra. 
252. Goldberg v. Johnson, 117 ill. 2d 493, 512 N.E.2d 1262 (1987), prob. juris. noted sub. 
nom. Goldberg v. Sweet, 108 S. Ct. 1010 (1988). 
253. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, para. 2004, (1985), quoted in Goldberg, 512 N.E.2d at 1265 
(emphasis omitted). 
254. In fact, the "internal consistency" issue was more complex than the provision quoted in 
the text suggests. The tax only applied if the call was "charged to the taxpayer's service address" 
in Illinois. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 120, para. 2002(b) (1985). Hence one could argue that the tax 
was "internally consistent": if every state imposed such a tax, the interstate call would be taxed 
no more than once - in the state of the taxpayer's service address. The Illinois court neverthe-
less found that the tax created "a real risk of multiple taxation ••• [because] at least two taxing 
jurisdictions levy a tax similar to the instant tax ... in Illinois." Goldberg, 512 N.E.2d at 1267. 
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the availability of a credit against telecommunications taxes paid to 
other states cured this apparent infirmity in the statute. 255 
The fact that the availability of a credit may prevent multiple taxa-
tion, however, does not resolve the question of fair apportionment. 
Unless one regards the fact that Illinois taxes only calls that are 
charged to an Illinois service address256 as a form of apportionment -
an argument that even the Illinois Supreme Court did not advance, 257 
it is difficult to contend that Illinois' telecommunications excise tax is 
fairly apportioned to the commercial activity that generates the gross 
receipts Illinois seeks to tax. Such activity is quintessentially interstate 
- the transmission of telephone signals across state lines - and the 
receipts it generates reflect activity both in Illinois and in other states. 
Yet Illinois "claim[s] as all its own the gross receipts to which the 
activity within its borders has contributed only a part."258 Insofar as 
the Illinois Supreme Court sought to justify the levy on the ground 
that it was imposed on a local "taxable event,"259 it smacks of the 
formalism that the Court has discarded and replaced with a commerce 
clause jurisprudence rooted in practical economic reality.260 And in-
sofar as the Illinois court sought to justify the levy on the ground that 
the credit precluded multiple taxation,261 its argument was essentially 
a non-sequitur that fails to respond to the underlying claim of unfair 
apportionment. 
There may well be a case to be made for the Illinois Supreme 
Court's refusal to confront the apportionment issue, apart from an in-
vocation of Supreme Court precedents such as Tyler Pipe that likewise 
fail to dispose of the fair apportionment issue in an analytically defen-
sible manner.262 Conceivably, apportionment of Illinois' telecommu-
nications excise tax is no more feasible as a practical matter than 
apportionment of retail sales and use taxes. If this were true, then 
failure to require true apportionment, and reliance on the credit as a 
means of avoiding multiple taxation, may be an acceptable bow to the 
The Court's reliance on the crediting provision of the tax as an answer to the multiple taxation 
claim, see text at note 237 supra, implies that it did not believe the levy was "internally consis-
tent" without the credit. 
255. Goldberg, 512 N.E.2d at 1267; see text at note 237 supra. 
256. See note 254 supra. 
257. Goldberg, 512 N.E.2d at 1266 ("it is not an apportioned tax"). 
258. General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 451 (1964) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
259. Goldberg, 512 N.E.2d at 1266. 
260. See text at notes 201-06 supra. But see note 249 supra. 
261. 512 N.E.2d at 1267. 
262. See text at notes 176-206 supra. 
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same administrative considerations that underlie the commerce clause 
principles governing retail sales and use taxes. This is not an argu-
ment on which the Illinois Supreme Court relied, however, in reaching 
its conclusion. Nor is it one that is particularly persuasive in light of 
the fact that other states apportion their taxes on interstate 
telecommunications. 263 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We come finally to the question to which the title of this article 
seems to promise a response - is "internal consistency" foolish? The 
answer is "no," at least in terms of the fundamental commerce clause 
policy underlying the "internal consistency" principle, namely, that 
interstate business should not be subject to additional tax burdens 
merely because it engages in commercial activity across state lines. On 
the other hand, the Court did not need to invoke the doctrine of "in-
ternal consistency" in striking down the unapportioned levies in 
Armco, Tyler Pipe, and Scheiner. It could have invalidated them 
under a straightforward application of the venerable fair apportion-
ment requirement. Had it taken this course, it might have "clear[ed] 
up the tangled underbrush of past cases"264 and made a positive con-
tribution to the Court's modem commerce clause jurisprudence. In-
stead, the Court has embraced a doctrine of "internal consistency" 
that may introduce confusion and uncertainty in an area of the law 
that has had more than its fair share of both. 
263. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 212.05(1)(e)2c (1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-56(C) (1986) (ef-
fective through July 1, 1988); VA. CoDE § 58.1-2623 (Supp. 1988) (repealed effective 1990 tax 
year). In any event, the Supreme Court will provide us with the final word on these and other 
issues raised by Goldberg when it renders its decision in the case during its October 1988 Term. 
264. Spector Motor Serv. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 612 (1951) (Clark, J., dissenting). 
